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Strategically revealing intentions in General Lotto
games
Keith Paarporn, Rahul Chandan, Dan Kovenock, Mahnoosh Alizadeh, and Jason
R. Marden

Abstract
Strategic decision-making in uncertain and adversarial environments is crucial for the security of
modern systems and infrastructures. A salient feature of many optimal decision-making policies is a
level of unpredictability, or randomness, which helps to keep an adversary uncertain about the system’s
behavior. This paper seeks to explore decision-making policies on the other end of the spectrum – namely,
whether there are benefits in revealing one’s strategic intentions to an opponent before engaging in
competition. We study these scenarios in a well-studied model of competitive resource allocation problem
known as General Lotto games. In the classic formulation, two competing players simultaneously allocate
their assets to a set of battlefields, and the resulting payoffs are derived in a zero-sum fashion. Here, we
consider a multi-step extension where one of the players has the option to publicly pre-commit assets
in a binding fashion to battlefields before play begins. In response, the opponent decides which of these
battlefields to secure (or abandon) by matching the pre-commitment with its own assets. They then
engage in a General Lotto game over the remaining set of battlefields. Interestingly, this paper highlights
many scenarios where strategically revealing intentions can actually significantly improve one’s payoff.
This runs contrary to the conventional wisdom that randomness should be a central component of
decision-making in adversarial environments.
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I. I NTRODUCTION
Society is increasingly reliant on autonomous technologies ingrained in critical infrastructures
and socio-technical systems, made possible by advances in computing, communication, and control. Ensuring the security of these systems against adversaries poses several problems that must
be addressed. As such, strategic decision-making in adversarial environments is consequential
to many problems, including the security of cyber-physical systems, perimeter defense, and
surveillance [2]–[5]. One well-studied framework for studying such systems is zero-sum games
where the primary focus centers on characterizing optimal (max-min) strategies for competing
players [6]–[9]. Several different formulations of zero-sum games have been investigated in the
control-theoretic literature encompassing asymmetric information, dynamics, and team-based
decision-making [10]–[12]. In many of these formulations, classic methodologies in feedback
and control have been instrumental in the derivation of optimal strategies.
This paper focuses on a class of zero-sum games (equivalently, constant-sum games) that
models resource allocation in competitive scenarios. In particular, two players must strategically
allocate their limited resources over a number of battlefields. A player wins the battlefields (and
their associated values) that it sends more resources to, and the objective is to maximize the total
value of secured battlefields. These scenarios are known in the literature as ”Colonel Blotto”
games. The equilibrium strategies are notoriously difficult to characterize, and general solutions
to the Blotto game are still an open problem [13]. For this reason, researchers often study the
General Lotto game, which only requires players to spend their resource budgets in expectation
[14]–[17]. It is more amenable to analysis while maintaining essential aspects of competitive
resource allocation. The Colonel Blotto game and its many variants can naturally be applied
to cyber-physical and networked system security [18]–[20], economic competition, and military
strategy [14], [21]–[26].
A salient feature of optimal decision-making policies in Colonel Blotto games is a level of
unpredictability, or randomness, which keeps an opponent uncertain about one’s behavior. In this
paper, we consider whether it is ever beneficial to reveal one’s strategic intentions to an opponent.
At first thought, doing so may only hurt one’s position in a competition as randomization makes
one’s strategy less exploitable by an opponent. Indeed, in the Colonel Blotto game, pure strategy
equilibria do not exist in most interesting cases (i.e. when players’ resource budgets are not
too asymmetric), and thus optimal mixed strategies must be characterized. However, there are
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practical contexts where revealing one’s strategies do provide benefits. For example, shows of
force are commonly used in military operations to discourage an enemy from engaging in conflict.
To study this aspect of adversarial interaction, we consider a sequenced formulation of General
Lotto games, in which one player has the option to pre-commit resources to battlefields. These
battlefields are then subject to a take-it or leave-it rule – the opponent, in response, must
decide which battlefields to secure by matching the pre-commitment with its own resources,
and which battlefields to withdraw from entirely. After the opponent makes a decision, both
players subsequently engage in a conventional General Lotto game on the remaining set of
battlefields.
We are primarily concerned about whether there are benefits for a single competitor to publicly
pre-commit resources in the multi-stage formulation. We investigate pre-commitments under two
different contexts. 1) The standard General Lotto game, which is a one-vs-one scenario over a
set of n battlefields that are commonly valued by both players. 2) A generalized General Lotto
game, which allows for battlefield valuations to be asymmetric across players [17]. We find there
are benefits to pre-commit in both contexts, though the types of benefits and conditions for them
to exist differ. Most notably, a weaker-resource player never has an incentive to pre-commit in
the first scenario. A weaker-resource player can have incentives to pre-commit in the second
scenario. Before providing a summary of our results and contributions, we first introduce General
Lotto games.
A. Background on General Lotto games
A General Lotto game consists of two players i = A, B, each with limited resource endowments XA , XB . They compete over a set of battlefields B = {1, . . . , n}. The endowments are
use-it-or-lose-it, as there is no opportunity cost for the players to use resources outside of the
game. An allocation for player i is a vector xi = {xi,b }b∈B ∈ Rn+ , which describes the division
of i’s resources to the n battlefields. Player i holds a valuation vi,b ≥ 0 for each battlefield b ∈ B.
Let us denote v i = {vi,b }b∈B as the vector of player i’s valuations. Player i wins battlefield b and
the value vi,b if it allocates more resources than its opponent. The losing player on b gets zero
value. An admissible strategy for player i is any n-variate distribution Fi over Rn+ (non-negative
real vectors) that satisfies the condition
"
Exi ∼Fi

#
X
b∈B
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In words, a player can randomize over any set of allocations, as long as the resources expended do not exceed its endowment in expectation. We refer to an instance of the game with
GL(XA , XB , v A , v B ).
We say the battlefield valuations are symmetric across players if vA,b = vB,b for all b ∈ B, and

asymmetric otherwise1 . In the symmetric case, there is an equilibrium payoff for both players. We
refer to an instance of the General Lotto game in the symmetric case with GL(XA , XB , v), where
the players’ valuations are encoded in a single valuation vector v (see Figure 2a). The equilibrium
strategies and payoffs for all instances of General Lotto games have been characterized in the
literature [16], [17], [27]. Multiple payoff-distinct equilibria can arise when the relative valuations
of battlefields are asymmetric across players [17].
B. A model of public pre-commitments
In this work, we evaluate whether there are advantages for a player to publicly pre-commit
resources in competition. To do so, we consider an extension of General Lotto games, where
one of the two players has the option to publicly pre-commit any amount of its resources to
multiple battlefields. This interaction proceeds according to the following three-stage sequence
of events.
1) One of the players, say B, selects a subset of battlefields P ⊆ B, and a pre-commitment,
P
which is a tuple p = {pb }b∈P satisfying b∈P pb ≤ XB . Here, pb ≥ 0 is the amount of resources
placed on battlefield b ∈ P. Once pre-committed, player B cannot add or take away the pb
resources from each of the battlefields b ∈ P.
2) In response, the opponent (A) engages in a bidding contest on each of the pre-committed
battlefields, where player B’s bid on battlefield b ∈ P is deterministic and fixed at pb . Player A
then has the opportunity to decide which of these battlefields to secure, and which ones to leave
behind. Player A secures battlefields by matching the pre-commitments with its own resources2 .
It withdraws entirely from the battlefields it decides not to match. We assume A’s response also
becomes public knowledge as soon as it is taken.
1

The equilibrium strategies in the symmetric case are also invariant to unilateral scaling of one of the player’s valuations, i.e.
if it holds that vA,b = K · vB,b ∀b ∈ B and for some K > 0. Here, the players’ valuations of the battlefields are relatively
identical. The analysis of [17] is required for cases of asymmetric and relatively different valuations.
2

In the bidding contests, we assume ties will be awarded to player A. This approximates (to arbitrary precision) the requirement
that player A sends pb + ϵ in order to secure b ∈ P, for any ϵ > 0.
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Nominal GL game

Step 1: B pre-commits

XA

XA

Step 2: A responds
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<latexit sha1_base64="x02KcIp0bqaKu7pIQWZ3u5fgUUI=">AAAB6nicbVDLSsNAFL2pr1pfVZduBovgqiS1+NgV3bisaB/QhjKZTtqhk0mYmRRK6Ce4caGIW7/InX/jJA2i1gMXDufcy733eBFnStv2p1VYWV1b3yhulra2d3b3yvsHbRXGktAWCXkoux5WlDNBW5ppTruRpDjwOO14k5vU70ypVCwUD3oWUTfAI8F8RrA20v10UBuUK3bVzoCWiZOTCuRoDsof/WFI4oAKTThWqufYkXYTLDUjnM5L/VjRCJMJHtGeoQIHVLlJduocnRhliPxQmhIaZerPiQQHSs0Cz3QGWI/VXy8V//N6sfYv3YSJKNZUkMUiP+ZIhyj9Gw2ZpETzmSGYSGZuRWSMJSbapFPKQrhKcf798jJp16rOWbV+V680rvM4inAEx3AKDlxAA26hCS0gMIJHeIYXi1tP1qv1tmgtWPnMIfyC9f4FI0KN1w==</latexit>

<latexit sha1_base64="KtNyJyhtT9P/tbTZQSXPd0AeJ1s=">AAAB6nicbVBNS8NAEJ3Ur1q/qh69LBbBU0lqqXorevFY0X5AG8pmu2mXbjZhdyOU0J/gxYMiXv1F3vw3btIgan0w8Hhvhpl5XsSZ0rb9aRVWVtfWN4qbpa3tnd298v5BR4WxJLRNQh7KnocV5UzQtmaa014kKQ48Trve9Dr1uw9UKhaKez2LqBvgsWA+I1gb6S4a1oblil21M6Bl4uSkAjlaw/LHYBSSOKBCE46V6jt2pN0ES80Ip/PSIFY0wmSKx7RvqMABVW6SnTpHJ0YZIT+UpoRGmfpzIsGBUrPAM50B1hP110vF/7x+rP0LN2EiijUVZLHIjznSIUr/RiMmKdF8ZggmkplbEZlgiYk26ZSyEC5TNL5fXiadWtU5q9Zv65XmVR5HEY7gGE7BgXNowg20oA0ExvAIz/BicevJerXeFq0FK585hF+w3r8AGh6N0Q==</latexit>

<latexit sha1_base64="5/Quhr3jnXRF2gst2NZebtOI+D0=">AAAB6nicbVDLSsNAFL2pr1pfVZduBovgqiS2+NgV3bisaB/QhjKZTtqhk0mYmRRK6Ce4caGIW7/InX/jJA2i1gMXDufcy733eBFnStv2p1VYWV1b3yhulra2d3b3yvsHbRXGktAWCXkoux5WlDNBW5ppTruRpDjwOO14k5vU70ypVCwUD3oWUTfAI8F8RrA20v10UBuUK3bVzoCWiZOTCuRoDsof/WFI4oAKTThWqufYkXYTLDUjnM5L/VjRCJMJHtGeoQIHVLlJduocnRhliPxQmhIaZerPiQQHSs0Cz3QGWI/VXy8V//N6sfYv3YSJKNZUkMUiP+ZIhyj9Gw2ZpETzmSGYSGZuRWSMJSbapFPKQrhKcf798jJpn1WdWrV+V680rvM4inAEx3AKDlxAA26hCS0gMIJHeIYXi1tP1qv1tmgtWPnMIfyC9f4FJMaN2A==</latexit>

p2

p1

<latexit sha1_base64="yNmDbYNdAPXthfaDmvKqvS3TDPg=">AAAB8HicbVDLSsNAFL2pr1pfVZduBovgxpJo8bGrunFZwT6kDWEynbZDZyZhZiKU0K9w40IRt36OO//GJA2i1gMXDufcy733+CFn2tj2p1VYWFxaXimultbWNza3yts7LR1EitAmCXigOj7WlDNJm4YZTjuholj4nLb98XXqtx+o0iyQd2YSUlfgoWQDRrBJpPuOd4mOUOg5XrliV+0MaJ44OalAjoZX/uj1AxIJKg3hWOuuY4fGjbEyjHA6LfUiTUNMxnhIuwmVWFDtxtnBU3SQKH00CFRS0qBM/TkRY6H1RPhJp8BmpP96qfif143M4NyNmQwjQyWZLRpEHJkApd+jPlOUGD5JCCaKJbciMsIKE5NkVMpCuEhx+v3yPGkdV52Tau22Vqlf5XEUYQ/24RAcOIM63EADmkBAwCM8w4ulrCfr1XqbtRasfGYXfsF6/wIb/I9x</latexit>

<latexit sha1_base64="+MRibBhlKpiQlPI7xVsSn1dwWtE=">AAAB6nicbVBNS8NAEJ3Ur1q/qh69LBbBU0m0VL1VvXisaD+gDWWz3bRLN5uwuxFK6E/w4kERr/4ib/4bN2kQtT4YeLw3w8w8L+JMadv+tApLyyura8X10sbm1vZOeXevrcJYEtoiIQ9l18OKciZoSzPNaTeSFAcepx1vcp36nQcqFQvFvZ5G1A3wSDCfEayNdNcdXA7KFbtqZ0CLxMlJBXI0B+WP/jAkcUCFJhwr1XPsSLsJlpoRTmelfqxohMkEj2jPUIEDqtwkO3WGjowyRH4oTQmNMvXnRIIDpaaBZzoDrMfqr5eK/3m9WPvnbsJEFGsqyHyRH3OkQ5T+jYZMUqL51BBMJDO3IjLGEhNt0illIVykqH+/vEjaJ1XntFq7rVUaV3kcRTiAQzgGB86gATfQhBYQGMEjPMOLxa0n69V6m7cWrHxmH37Bev8CDEqNyA==</latexit>

<latexit sha1_base64="+MRibBhlKpiQlPI7xVsSn1dwWtE=">AAAB6nicbVBNS8NAEJ3Ur1q/qh69LBbBU0m0VL1VvXisaD+gDWWz3bRLN5uwuxFK6E/w4kERr/4ib/4bN2kQtT4YeLw3w8w8L+JMadv+tApLyyura8X10sbm1vZOeXevrcJYEtoiIQ9l18OKciZoSzPNaTeSFAcepx1vcp36nQcqFQvFvZ5G1A3wSDCfEayNdNcdXA7KFbtqZ0CLxMlJBXI0B+WP/jAkcUCFJhwr1XPsSLsJlpoRTmelfqxohMkEj2jPUIEDqtwkO3WGjowyRH4oTQmNMvXnRIIDpaaBZzoDrMfqr5eK/3m9WPvnbsJEFGsqyHyRH3OkQ5T+jYZMUqL51BBMJDO3IjLGEhNt0illIVykqH+/vEjaJ1XntFq7rVUaV3kcRTiAQzgGB86gATfQhBYQGMEjPMOLxa0n69V6m7cWrHxmH37Bev8CDEqNyA==</latexit>

<latexit sha1_base64="+MRibBhlKpiQlPI7xVsSn1dwWtE=">AAAB6nicbVBNS8NAEJ3Ur1q/qh69LBbBU0m0VL1VvXisaD+gDWWz3bRLN5uwuxFK6E/w4kERr/4ib/4bN2kQtT4YeLw3w8w8L+JMadv+tApLyyura8X10sbm1vZOeXevrcJYEtoiIQ9l18OKciZoSzPNaTeSFAcepx1vcp36nQcqFQvFvZ5G1A3wSDCfEayNdNcdXA7KFbtqZ0CLxMlJBXI0B+WP/jAkcUCFJhwr1XPsSLsJlpoRTmelfqxohMkEj2jPUIEDqtwkO3WGjowyRH4oTQmNMvXnRIIDpaaBZzoDrMfqr5eK/3m9WPvnbsJEFGsqyHyRH3OkQ5T+jYZMUqL51BBMJDO3IjLGEhNt0illIVykqH+/vEjaJ1XntFq7rVUaV3kcRTiAQzgGB86gATfQhBYQGMEjPMOLxa0n69V6m7cWrHxmH37Bev8CDEqNyA==</latexit>

vn
<latexit sha1_base64="nftV+Shkx3fR9ZGLDtlHVRA4J4U=">AAAB6nicbVBNS8NAEJ3Ur1q/qh69LBbBU0m0VL0VvXisaD+gDWWz3bRLN5uwuymU0J/gxYMiXv1F3vw3btIgan0w8Hhvhpl5XsSZ0rb9aRVWVtfWN4qbpa3tnd298v5BW4WxJLRFQh7KrocV5UzQlmaa024kKQ48Tjve5Cb1O1MqFQvFg55F1A3wSDCfEayNdD8diEG5YlftDGiZODmpQI7moPzRH4YkDqjQhGOleo4daTfBUjPC6bzUjxWNMJngEe0ZKnBAlZtkp87RiVGGyA+lKaFRpv6cSHCg1CzwTGeA9Vj99VLxP68Xa//STZiIYk0FWSzyY450iNK/0ZBJSjSfGYKJZOZWRMZYYqJNOqUshKsU9e+Xl0n7rOqcV2t3tUrjOo+jCEdwDKfgwAU04Baa0AICI3iEZ3ixuPVkvVpvi9aClc8cwi9Y719+Mo4T</latexit>

0
<latexit sha1_base64="EBsDC7Ff85i616MWa3p6kkD+78o=">AAAB6HicbVDJSgNBEK1xjXGLevTSGARPYUaDyy3oxWMCZoFkCD2dStKmZ6G7RwhDvsCLB0W8+kne/Bt7JoOo8UHB470qqup5keBK2/antbS8srq2Xtgobm5t7+yW9vZbKowlwyYLRSg7HlUoeIBNzbXATiSR+p7Atje5Sf32A0rFw+BOTyN0fToK+JAzqo3UsPulsl2xM5BF4uSkDDnq/dJHbxCy2MdAM0GV6jp2pN2ESs2ZwFmxFyuMKJvQEXYNDaiPyk2yQ2fk2CgDMgylqUCTTP05kVBfqanvmU6f6rH666Xif1431sNLN+FBFGsM2HzRMBZEhyT9mgy4RKbF1BDKJDe3EjamkjJtsilmIVylOP9+eZG0TivOWaXaqJZr13kcBTiEIzgBBy6gBrdQhyYwQHiEZ3ix7q0n69V6m7cuWfnMAfyC9f4FkjOM7A==</latexit>

<latexit sha1_base64="82xV0IjdH7jeFzXrjsikk2AHeiA=">AAAB+nicbVC5TsNAFFyHK4TLgZJmRYREFTkh4ugiaCiDRA4psaz1Zp2ssj60+wxEJp9CQwFCtHwJHX/D2rEQEKYazbynN2/cSHAFlvVpFJaWV1bXiuuljc2t7R2zvNtRYSwpa9NQhLLnEsUED1gbOAjWiyQjvitY151cpn73lknFw+AGphGzfTIKuMcpAS05ZtnCA2D3kOBQ4hmOnLpjVqyqlQEvklpOKihHyzE/BsOQxj4LgAqiVL9mRWAnRAKngs1Kg1ixiNAJGbG+pgHxmbKTLPoMH2pliD193AsDwJn6cyMhvlJT39WTPoGx+uul4n9ePwbvzE54EMXAAjo/5MUCQ4jTHvCQS0ZBTDUhVHKdFdMxkYSCbquUlXCe4uT75UXSqVdrx9XGdaPSvMjrKKJ9dICOUA2doia6Qi3URhTdoUf0jF6MB+PJeDXe5qMFI9/ZQ79gvH8B1dqTOA==</latexit>

v1
<latexit sha1_base64="24V4TYL3pELRQcm3g3L1rdPV4y8=">AAAB6nicbVBNS8NAEJ3Ur1q/qh69LBbBU0m0VL0VvXisaD+gDWWz3bRLN5uwuymU0J/gxYMiXv1F3vw3btIgan0w8Hhvhpl5XsSZ0rb9aRVWVtfWN4qbpa3tnd298v5BW4WxJLRFQh7KrocV5UzQlmaa024kKQ48Tjve5Cb1O1MqFQvFg55F1A3wSDCfEayNdD8dOINyxa7aGdAycXJSgRzNQfmjPwxJHFChCcdK9Rw70m6CpWaE03mpHysaYTLBI9ozVOCAKjfJTp2jE6MMkR9KU0KjTP05keBAqVngmc4A67H666Xif14v1v6lmzARxZoKsljkxxzpEKV/oyGTlGg+MwQTycytiIyxxESbdEpZCFcp6t8vL5P2WdU5r9buapXGdR5HEY7gGE7BgQtowC00oQUERvAIz/BicevJerXeFq0FK585hF+w3r8AIb6N1g==</latexit>

<latexit sha1_base64="Qj28VB2xuRs/PwX+LYT4vWHQ1rI=">AAAB6nicbVDLSsNAFL2pr1pfUZduBovgqiRafOyKblxWtA9oQ5lMJ+3QySTMTIQS+gluXCji1i9y5984SYOo9cCFwzn3cu89fsyZ0o7zaZWWlldW18rrlY3Nre0de3evraJEEtoiEY9k18eKciZoSzPNaTeWFIc+px1/cp35nQcqFYvEvZ7G1AvxSLCAEayNdBcP3IFddWpODrRI3IJUoUBzYH/0hxFJQio04VipnuvE2kux1IxwOqv0E0VjTCZ4RHuGChxS5aX5qTN0ZJQhCiJpSmiUqz8nUhwqNQ190xliPVZ/vUz8z+slOrjwUibiRFNB5ouChCMdoexvNGSSEs2nhmAimbkVkTGWmGiTTiUP4TLD2ffLi6R9UnNPa/XberVxVcRRhgM4hGNw4RwacANNaAGBETzCM7xY3HqyXq23eWvJKmb24Res9y8Ymo3Q</latexit>

p1

v2 v3 · · ·
<latexit sha1_base64="1DuaMldMYSGwnuUayY1NqaaVHl4=">AAAB7XicbVDLSsNAFL2pr1pfVZdugkVwVRItPnZFNy4r2Ae0oUwmk3bsZCbMTIQS+g9uXCji1v9x5984SYOo9cCFwzn3cu89fsyo0o7zaZWWlldW18rrlY3Nre2d6u5eR4lEYtLGggnZ85EijHLS1lQz0oslQZHPSNefXGd+94FIRQW/09OYeBEacRpSjLSROgMcCK2G1ZpTd3LYi8QtSA0KtIbVj0EgcBIRrjFDSvVdJ9ZeiqSmmJFZZZAoEiM8QSPSN5SjiCgvza+d2UdGCexQSFNc27n6cyJFkVLTyDedEdJj9dfLxP+8fqLDCy+lPE404Xi+KEyYrYWdvW4HVBKs2dQQhCU1t9p4jCTC2gRUyUO4zHD2/fIi6ZzU3dN647ZRa14VcZThAA7hGFw4hybcQAvagOEeHuEZXixhPVmv1tu8tWQVM/vwC9b7F8dxj2c=</latexit>

<latexit sha1_base64="x02KcIp0bqaKu7pIQWZ3u5fgUUI=">AAAB6nicbVDLSsNAFL2pr1pfVZduBovgqiS1+NgV3bisaB/QhjKZTtqhk0mYmRRK6Ce4caGIW7/InX/jJA2i1gMXDufcy733eBFnStv2p1VYWV1b3yhulra2d3b3yvsHbRXGktAWCXkoux5WlDNBW5ppTruRpDjwOO14k5vU70ypVCwUD3oWUTfAI8F8RrA20v10UBuUK3bVzoCWiZOTCuRoDsof/WFI4oAKTThWqufYkXYTLDUjnM5L/VjRCJMJHtGeoQIHVLlJduocnRhliPxQmhIaZerPiQQHSs0Cz3QGWI/VXy8V//N6sfYv3YSJKNZUkMUiP+ZIhyj9Gw2ZpETzmSGYSGZuRWSMJSbapFPKQrhKcf798jJp16rOWbV+V680rvM4inAEx3AKDlxAA26hCS0gMIJHeIYXi1tP1qv1tmgtWPnMIfyC9f4FI0KN1w==</latexit>

<latexit sha1_base64="5/Quhr3jnXRF2gst2NZebtOI+D0=">AAAB6nicbVDLSsNAFL2pr1pfVZduBovgqiS2+NgV3bisaB/QhjKZTtqhk0mYmRRK6Ce4caGIW7/InX/jJA2i1gMXDufcy733eBFnStv2p1VYWV1b3yhulra2d3b3yvsHbRXGktAWCXkoux5WlDNBW5ppTruRpDjwOO14k5vU70ypVCwUD3oWUTfAI8F8RrA20v10UBuUK3bVzoCWiZOTCuRoDsof/WFI4oAKTThWqufYkXYTLDUjnM5L/VjRCJMJHtGeoQIHVLlJduocnRhliPxQmhIaZerPiQQHSs0Cz3QGWI/VXy8V//N6sfYv3YSJKNZUkMUiP+ZIhyj9Gw2ZpETzmSGYSGZuRWSMJSbapFPKQrhKcf798jJpn1WdWrV+V680rvM4inAEx3AKDlxAA26hCS0gMIJHeIYXi1tP1qv1tmgtWPnMIfyC9f4FJMaN2A==</latexit>

<latexit sha1_base64="KtNyJyhtT9P/tbTZQSXPd0AeJ1s=">AAAB6nicbVBNS8NAEJ3Ur1q/qh69LBbBU0lqqXorevFY0X5AG8pmu2mXbjZhdyOU0J/gxYMiXv1F3vw3btIgan0w8Hhvhpl5XsSZ0rb9aRVWVtfWN4qbpa3tnd298v5BR4WxJLRNQh7KnocV5UzQtmaa014kKQ48Trve9Dr1uw9UKhaKez2LqBvgsWA+I1gb6S4a1oblil21M6Bl4uSkAjlaw/LHYBSSOKBCE46V6jt2pN0ES80Ip/PSIFY0wmSKx7RvqMABVW6SnTpHJ0YZIT+UpoRGmfpzIsGBUrPAM50B1hP110vF/7x+rP0LN2EiijUVZLHIjznSIUr/RiMmKdF8ZggmkplbEZlgiYk26ZSyEC5TNL5fXiadWtU5q9Zv65XmVR5HEY7gGE7BgXNowg20oA0ExvAIz/BicevJerXeFq0FK585hF+w3r8AGh6N0Q==</latexit>

p2

vn
<latexit sha1_base64="nftV+Shkx3fR9ZGLDtlHVRA4J4U=">AAAB6nicbVBNS8NAEJ3Ur1q/qh69LBbBU0m0VL0VvXisaD+gDWWz3bRLN5uwuymU0J/gxYMiXv1F3vw3btIgan0w8Hhvhpl5XsSZ0rb9aRVWVtfWN4qbpa3tnd298v5BW4WxJLRFQh7KrocV5UzQlmaa024kKQ48Tjve5Cb1O1MqFQvFg55F1A3wSDCfEayNdD8diEG5YlftDGiZODmpQI7moPzRH4YkDqjQhGOleo4daTfBUjPC6bzUjxWNMJngEe0ZKnBAlZtkp87RiVGGyA+lKaFRpv6cSHCg1CzwTGeA9Vj99VLxP68Xa//STZiIYk0FWSzyY450iNK/0ZBJSjSfGYKJZOZWRMZYYqJNOqUshKsU9e+Xl0n7rOqcV2t3tUrjOo+jCEdwDKfgwAU04Baa0AICI3iEZ3ixuPVkvVpvi9aClc8cwi9Y719+Mo4T</latexit>

v2 v3 · · ·

v1

<latexit sha1_base64="1DuaMldMYSGwnuUayY1NqaaVHl4=">AAAB7XicbVDLSsNAFL2pr1pfVZdugkVwVRItPnZFNy4r2Ae0oUwmk3bsZCbMTIQS+g9uXCji1v9x5984SYOo9cCFwzn3cu89fsyo0o7zaZWWlldW18rrlY3Nre2d6u5eR4lEYtLGggnZ85EijHLS1lQz0oslQZHPSNefXGd+94FIRQW/09OYeBEacRpSjLSROgMcCK2G1ZpTd3LYi8QtSA0KtIbVj0EgcBIRrjFDSvVdJ9ZeiqSmmJFZZZAoEiM8QSPSN5SjiCgvza+d2UdGCexQSFNc27n6cyJFkVLTyDedEdJj9dfLxP+8fqLDCy+lPE404Xi+KEyYrYWdvW4HVBKs2dQQhCU1t9p4jCTC2gRUyUO4zHD2/fIi6ZzU3dN647ZRa14VcZThAA7hGFw4hybcQAvagOEeHuEZXixhPVmv1tu8tWQVM/vwC9b7F8dxj2c=</latexit>

<latexit sha1_base64="24V4TYL3pELRQcm3g3L1rdPV4y8=">AAAB6nicbVBNS8NAEJ3Ur1q/qh69LBbBU0m0VL0VvXisaD+gDWWz3bRLN5uwuymU0J/gxYMiXv1F3vw3btIgan0w8Hhvhpl5XsSZ0rb9aRVWVtfWN4qbpa3tnd298v5BW4WxJLRFQh7KrocV5UzQlmaa024kKQ48Tjve5Cb1O1MqFQvFg55F1A3wSDCfEayNdD8dOINyxa7aGdAycXJSgRzNQfmjPwxJHFChCcdK9Rw70m6CpWaE03mpHysaYTLBI9ozVOCAKjfJTp2jE6MMkR9KU0KjTP05keBAqVngmc4A67H666Xif14v1v6lmzARxZoKsljkxxzpEKV/oyGTlGg+MwQTycytiIyxxESbdEpZCFcp6t8vL5P2WdU5r9buapXGdR5HEY7gGE7BgQtowC00oQUERvAIz/BicevJerXeFq0FK585hF+w3r8AIb6N1g==</latexit>

<latexit sha1_base64="Qj28VB2xuRs/PwX+LYT4vWHQ1rI=">AAAB6nicbVDLSsNAFL2pr1pfUZduBovgqiRafOyKblxWtA9oQ5lMJ+3QySTMTIQS+gluXCji1i9y5984SYOo9cCFwzn3cu89fsyZ0o7zaZWWlldW18rrlY3Nre0de3evraJEEtoiEY9k18eKciZoSzPNaTeWFIc+px1/cp35nQcqFYvEvZ7G1AvxSLCAEayNdBcP3IFddWpODrRI3IJUoUBzYH/0hxFJQio04VipnuvE2kux1IxwOqv0E0VjTCZ4RHuGChxS5aX5qTN0ZJQhCiJpSmiUqz8nUhwqNQ190xliPVZ/vUz8z+slOrjwUibiRFNB5ouChCMdoexvNGSSEs2nhmAimbkVkTGWmGiTTiUP4TLD2ffLi6R9UnNPa/XberVxVcRRhgM4hGNw4RwacANNaAGBETzCM7xY3HqyXq23eWvJKmb24Res9y8Ymo3Q</latexit>

p1

<latexit sha1_base64="x02KcIp0bqaKu7pIQWZ3u5fgUUI=">AAAB6nicbVDLSsNAFL2pr1pfVZduBovgqiS1+NgV3bisaB/QhjKZTtqhk0mYmRRK6Ce4caGIW7/InX/jJA2i1gMXDufcy733eBFnStv2p1VYWV1b3yhulra2d3b3yvsHbRXGktAWCXkoux5WlDNBW5ppTruRpDjwOO14k5vU70ypVCwUD3oWUTfAI8F8RrA20v10UBuUK3bVzoCWiZOTCuRoDsof/WFI4oAKTThWqufYkXYTLDUjnM5L/VjRCJMJHtGeoQIHVLlJduocnRhliPxQmhIaZerPiQQHSs0Cz3QGWI/VXy8V//N6sfYv3YSJKNZUkMUiP+ZIhyj9Gw2ZpETzmSGYSGZuRWSMJSbapFPKQrhKcf798jJp16rOWbV+V680rvM4inAEx3AKDlxAA26hCS0gMIJHeIYXi1tP1qv1tmgtWPnMIfyC9f4FI0KN1w==</latexit>

<latexit sha1_base64="5/Quhr3jnXRF2gst2NZebtOI+D0=">AAAB6nicbVDLSsNAFL2pr1pfVZduBovgqiS2+NgV3bisaB/QhjKZTtqhk0mYmRRK6Ce4caGIW7/InX/jJA2i1gMXDufcy733eBFnStv2p1VYWV1b3yhulra2d3b3yvsHbRXGktAWCXkoux5WlDNBW5ppTruRpDjwOO14k5vU70ypVCwUD3oWUTfAI8F8RrA20v10UBuUK3bVzoCWiZOTCuRoDsof/WFI4oAKTThWqufYkXYTLDUjnM5L/VjRCJMJHtGeoQIHVLlJduocnRhliPxQmhIaZerPiQQHSs0Cz3QGWI/VXy8V//N6sfYv3YSJKNZUkMUiP+ZIhyj9Gw2ZpETzmSGYSGZuRWSMJSbapFPKQrhKcf798jJpn1WdWrV+V680rvM4inAEx3AKDlxAA26hCS0gMIJHeIYXi1tP1qv1tmgtWPnMIfyC9f4FJMaN2A==</latexit>

<latexit sha1_base64="KtNyJyhtT9P/tbTZQSXPd0AeJ1s=">AAAB6nicbVBNS8NAEJ3Ur1q/qh69LBbBU0lqqXorevFY0X5AG8pmu2mXbjZhdyOU0J/gxYMiXv1F3vw3btIgan0w8Hhvhpl5XsSZ0rb9aRVWVtfWN4qbpa3tnd298v5BR4WxJLRNQh7KnocV5UzQtmaa014kKQ48Trve9Dr1uw9UKhaKez2LqBvgsWA+I1gb6S4a1oblil21M6Bl4uSkAjlaw/LHYBSSOKBCE46V6jt2pN0ES80Ip/PSIFY0wmSKx7RvqMABVW6SnTpHJ0YZIT+UpoRGmfpzIsGBUrPAM50B1hP110vF/7x+rP0LN2EiijUVZLHIjznSIUr/RiMmKdF8ZggmkplbEZlgiYk26ZSyEC5TNL5fXiadWtU5q9Zv65XmVR5HEY7gGE7BgXNowg20oA0ExvAIz/BicevJerXeFq0FK585hF+w3r8AGh6N0Q==</latexit>

vn
<latexit sha1_base64="nftV+Shkx3fR9ZGLDtlHVRA4J4U=">AAAB6nicbVBNS8NAEJ3Ur1q/qh69LBbBU0m0VL0VvXisaD+gDWWz3bRLN5uwuymU0J/gxYMiXv1F3vw3btIgan0w8Hhvhpl5XsSZ0rb9aRVWVtfWN4qbpa3tnd298v5BW4WxJLRFQh7KrocV5UzQlmaa024kKQ48Tjve5Cb1O1MqFQvFg55F1A3wSDCfEayNdD8diEG5YlftDGiZODmpQI7moPzRH4YkDqjQhGOleo4daTfBUjPC6bzUjxWNMJngEe0ZKnBAlZtkp87RiVGGyA+lKaFRpv6cSHCg1CzwTGeA9Vj99VLxP68Xa//STZiIYk0FWSzyY450iNK/0ZBJSjSfGYKJZOZWRMZYYqJNOqUshKsU9e+Xl0n7rOqcV2t3tUrjOo+jCEdwDKfgwAU04Baa0AICI3iEZ3ixuPVkvVpvi9aClc8cwi9Y719+Mo4T</latexit>

p2

XB
<latexit sha1_base64="NoOEn6XDFXGteP7b0e5K0Xep1LA=">AAAB6nicbVBNS8NAEJ3Ur1q/qh69LBbBU0m0VL2VevFY0X5AG8pmu2mXbjZhdyOU0J/gxYMiXv1F3vw3btIgan0w8Hhvhpl5XsSZ0rb9aRVWVtfWN4qbpa3tnd298v5BR4WxJLRNQh7KnocV5UzQtmaa014kKQ48Trve9Dr1uw9UKhaKez2LqBvgsWA+I1gb6a43bA7LFbtqZ0DLxMlJBXK0huWPwSgkcUCFJhwr1XfsSLsJlpoRTuelQaxohMkUj2nfUIEDqtwkO3WOTowyQn4oTQmNMvXnRIIDpWaBZzoDrCfqr5eK/3n9WPuXbsJEFGsqyGKRH3OkQ5T+jUZMUqL5zBBMJDO3IjLBEhNt0illIVylqH+/vEw6Z1XnvFq7rVUazTyOIhzBMZyCAxfQgBtoQRsIjOERnuHF4taT9Wq9LVoLVj5zCL9gvX8BDc6NyQ==</latexit>

<latexit sha1_base64="NoOEn6XDFXGteP7b0e5K0Xep1LA=">AAAB6nicbVBNS8NAEJ3Ur1q/qh69LBbBU0m0VL2VevFY0X5AG8pmu2mXbjZhdyOU0J/gxYMiXv1F3vw3btIgan0w8Hhvhpl5XsSZ0rb9aRVWVtfWN4qbpa3tnd298v5BR4WxJLRNQh7KnocV5UzQtmaa014kKQ48Trve9Dr1uw9UKhaKez2LqBvgsWA+I1gb6a43bA7LFbtqZ0DLxMlJBXK0huWPwSgkcUCFJhwr1XfsSLsJlpoRTuelQaxohMkUj2nfUIEDqtwkO3WOTowyQn4oTQmNMvXnRIIDpWaBZzoDrCfqr5eK/3n9WPuXbsJEFGsqyGKRH3OkQ5T+jUZMUqL5zBBMJDO3IjLBEhNt0illIVylqH+/vEw6Z1XnvFq7rVUazTyOIhzBMZyCAxfQgBtoQRsIjOERnuHF4taT9Wq9LVoLVj5zCL9gvX8BDc6NyQ==</latexit>

pre-commit
<latexit sha1_base64="DzvlOw+flPxczXLbaCwb/mE78RI=">AAAB+nicbVDLSsNAFJ3UV62vVJdugkVwY0m0+NgV3bisYB/QhjKZTtqhM0mYuVFL7Ke4caGIW7/EnX/jJA2i1gMDh3Pu4d45XsSZAtv+NAoLi0vLK8XV0tr6xuaWWd5uqTCWhDZJyEPZ8bCinAW0CQw47USSYuFx2vbGl6nfvqVSsTC4gUlEXYGHAfMZwaClvlnuAb2HRGcOSSgEg2nfrNhVO4M1T5ycVFCORt/86A1CEgsaAOFYqa5jR+AmWAIjnE5LvVjRCJMxHtKupgEWVLlJdvrU2tfKwPJDqV8AVqb+TCRYKDURnp4UGEbqr5eK/3ndGPwzN2FBFAMNyGyRH3MLQivtwRowSQnwiSaYSKZvtcgIS0xAt1XKSjhPcfL95XnSOqo6x9Xada1Sv8jrKKJdtIcOkINOUR1doQZqIoLu0CN6Ri/Gg/FkvBpvs9GCkWd20C8Y718HJpSj</latexit>

XB
<latexit sha1_base64="OJq1n1yDX3cOy1589XWpDtYBqu4=">AAAB+HicbVDLSsNAFL2pr1ofjbp0M1gEN5akFh+7UjcuK9gHtCFMppN26OTBzESopV/ixoUibv0Ud/6NkzSIWg/cy+Gce5k7x4s5k8qyPo3Cyura+kZxs7S1vbNbNvf2OzJKBKFtEvFI9DwsKWchbSumOO3FguLA47TrTa5Tv3tPhWRReKemMXUCPAqZzwhWWnLNcs9tolMUu3bWa65ZsapWBrRM7JxUIEfLNT8Gw4gkAQ0V4VjKvm3FyplhoRjhdF4aJJLGmEzwiPY1DXFApTPLDp+jY60MkR8JXaFCmfpzY4YDKaeBpycDrMbyr5eK/3n9RPmXzoyFcaJoSBYP+QlHKkJpCmjIBCWKTzXBRDB9KyJjLDBROqtSFsJVivPvLy+TTq1qn1Xrt/VKo5nHUYRDOIITsOECGnADLWgDgQQe4RlejAfjyXg13hajBSPfOYBfMN6/AK9NkU0=</latexit>

(a)

p1

p2

XB
<latexit sha1_base64="OJq1n1yDX3cOy1589XWpDtYBqu4=">AAAB+HicbVDLSsNAFL2pr1ofjbp0M1gEN5akFh+7UjcuK9gHtCFMppN26OTBzESopV/ixoUibv0Ud/6NkzSIWg/cy+Gce5k7x4s5k8qyPo3Cyura+kZxs7S1vbNbNvf2OzJKBKFtEvFI9DwsKWchbSumOO3FguLA47TrTa5Tv3tPhWRReKemMXUCPAqZzwhWWnLNcs9tolMUu3bWa65ZsapWBrRM7JxUIEfLNT8Gw4gkAQ0V4VjKvm3FyplhoRjhdF4aJJLGmEzwiPY1DXFApTPLDp+jY60MkR8JXaFCmfpzY4YDKaeBpycDrMbyr5eK/3n9RPmXzoyFcaJoSBYP+QlHKkJpCmjIBCWKTzXBRDB9KyJjLDBROqtSFsJVivPvLy+TTq1qn1Xrt/VKo5nHUYRDOIITsOECGnADLWgDgQQe4RlejAfjyXg13hajBSPfOYBfMN6/AK9NkU0=</latexit>

p1

p2

(b)

Fig. 1: Model of public pre-commitments. (a) For simplicity, we depict General Lotto games where battlefield
valuations are symmetric across players in these diagrams, i.e. GL(XA , XB , v). This is the nominal interaction if
no player has the option to pre-commit resources, or the pre-committing player chooses not to pre-commit any
resources. (b) Diagrams showing the sequence of events when player B has the option to pre-commit. In step 1,
B pre-commits p1 and p2 resources to battlefields 1 and 2, respectively. In step 2, A publicly responds to the
pre-commitments by either matching or withdrawing. It secures the battlefields it matches, and loses the ones it
withdraws from. In step 3, the players engage in a GL game on the remaining set of battlefields with their remaining
resources.

3) The battlefields A secures in stage 2 are awarded to player A, and the battlefields A withdrew
from are awarded to player B. No additional resources can be devoted to these battlefields. Both
players subsequently engage in the game GL(XA − pA , XB − p, {vA,b }b∈P
/ , {vB,b }b∈P
/ ) on the
P
remaining set of battlefields B\P with their remaining resources. Here we denote p = b∈P pb
as the total amount of resources B used for pre-commitments, and pA ≤ p as the amount of
resources A used to match pre-commitments in its response.
An illustration of this procedure3 is given in Figure 1b. A criteria for whether pre-commitments
offer any advantages for player B is to compare the payoff it obtains, i.e. the value of battlefields
A withdraws from plus the payoff from engaging in the subsequent GL game in stage 3, to the
payoff it would obtain if it did not have the option to pre-commit at all, i.e. its equilibrium payoff
from the nominal game GL(XA , XB , v A , v B ). Here, we are assuming player A makes the optimal
response to the pre-commitment, such that its subsequent payoff in stage 3 is maximized.
C. Overview of contributions
This paper analyzes scenarios where there is an advantage for a competitor to pre-commit
resources. We study two distinct scenarios – in the first scenario, the players are engaged in
3

In our model, we are assuming in stage 2 that player A’s response to the pre-commitment becomes common knowledge
before the subsequent Lotto game is played in stage 3. One can consider alternative formulations where such a response is not
made public to the pre-committing player. Such analyses are outside the scope of the present paper, and we leave them as future
research directions.
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GL game
with pre-commitment
<latexit sha1_base64="Yptp+hALJxHgXOzo2R3Ou77/36A=">AAAB9XicbVDLSsNAFJ3UV62vqks3g0VwVRItPnZFF7pwUcE+oI1lMp22QyeTMHOjltD/cONCEbf+izv/xkkaRK0HLhzOuZd77/FCwTXY9qeVm5tfWFzKLxdWVtfWN4qbWw0dRIqyOg1EoFoe0UxwyerAQbBWqBjxPcGa3ug88Zt3TGkeyBsYh8z1yUDyPqcEjHTbAfYA8cUVHhCfTbrFkl22U+BZ4mSkhDLUusWPTi+gkc8kUEG0bjt2CG5MFHAq2KTQiTQLCR2RAWsbKs0S7cbp1RO8Z5Qe7gfKlAScqj8nYuJrPfY90+kTGOq/XiL+57Uj6J+4MZdhBEzS6aJ+JDAEOIkA97hiFMTYEEIVN7diOiSKUDBBFdIQThMcfb88SxoHZeewXLmulKpnWRx5tIN20T5y0DGqoktUQ3VEkUKP6Bm9WPfWk/VqvU1bc1Y2s41+wXr/Anw3kqQ=</latexit>

<latexit sha1_base64="IA/I8A38XjB6t+ykjTcBsNS47GA=">AAACA3icbVDLSgMxFM34rPVVdaebYBHcWKZafOyKblxWsA9oh5JJ0zY0mQzJHbUMBTf+ihsXirj1J9z5N2baQdR6IHA45x5u7vFDwQ247qczMzs3v7CYWcour6yurec2NmtGRZqyKlVC6YZPDBM8YFXgIFgj1IxIX7C6P7hI/PoN04ar4BqGIfMk6QW8yykBK7Vz2y1gdxDfcuhjGzygSkoOkgUwaufybsEdA0+TYkryKEWlnftodRSNkjAVxJhm0Q3Bi4kGTgUbZVuRYSGhA9JjTUsDIpnx4vENI7xnlQ7uKm1fAHis/kzERBozlL6dlAT65q+XiP95zQi6p17MgzACFtDJom4kMCicFII7XDMKYmgJoZrbv2LaJ5pQsLVlxyWcJTj+Pnma1A4LxaNC6aqUL5+ndWTQDtpF+6iITlAZXaIKqiKK7tEjekYvzoPz5Lw6b5PRGSfNbKFfcN6/AAhAmI0=</latexit>

XA
<latexit sha1_base64="+MRibBhlKpiQlPI7xVsSn1dwWtE=">AAAB6nicbVBNS8NAEJ3Ur1q/qh69LBbBU0m0VL1VvXisaD+gDWWz3bRLN5uwuxFK6E/w4kERr/4ib/4bN2kQtT4YeLw3w8w8L+JMadv+tApLyyura8X10sbm1vZOeXevrcJYEtoiIQ9l18OKciZoSzPNaTeSFAcepx1vcp36nQcqFQvFvZ5G1A3wSDCfEayNdNcdXA7KFbtqZ0CLxMlJBXI0B+WP/jAkcUCFJhwr1XPsSLsJlpoRTmelfqxohMkEj2jPUIEDqtwkO3WGjowyRH4oTQmNMvXnRIIDpaaBZzoDrMfqr5eK/3m9WPvnbsJEFGsqyHyRH3OkQ5T+jYZMUqL51BBMJDO3IjLGEhNt0illIVykqH+/vEjaJ1XntFq7rVUaV3kcRTiAQzgGB86gATfQhBYQGMEjPMOLxa0n69V6m7cWrHxmH37Bev8CDEqNyA==</latexit>

respond
0 or p
<latexit sha1_base64="+/jteZlzmFZaX7A4QXVR8c4eO3E=">AAAB9XicbVBNS8NAEN3Ur1q/qh69BIvgqSRa/LgVvXisYD+gjWWzmbRLN5uwO1FL6P/w4kERr/4Xb/4bkzaIWh8MPN6bYWaeGwmu0bI+jcLC4tLySnG1tLa+sblV3t5p6TBWDJosFKHquFSD4BKayFFAJ1JAA1dA2x1dZn77DpTmobzBcQROQAeS+5xRTKXbHsIDJgp0FEpv0i9XrKo1hTlP7JxUSI5Gv/zR80IWByCRCap117YidBKqkDMBk1Iv1hBRNqID6KZU0gC0k0yvnpgHqeKZfqjSkmhO1Z8TCQ20Hgdu2hlQHOq/Xib+53Vj9M+chMsoRpBstsiPhYmhmUVgelwBQzFOCWWKp7eabEgVZZgGVZqGcJ7h5PvledI6qtrH1dp1rVK/yOMokj2yTw6JTU5JnVyRBmkSRhR5JM/kxbg3noxX423WWjDymV3yC8b7F4evk1I=</latexit>

<latexit sha1_base64="JUVChADgPq8lJlDUYn36TZ2pJUk=">AAAB+HicbVDLSsNAFJ3UV62PRl26GSyCq5Jo8bErunFZwT6gDWUynbRDJ5kwcyPW0C9x40IRt36KO//GSRtErWd1OOde7rnHjwXX4DifVmFpeWV1rbhe2tjc2i7bO7stLRNFWZNKIVXHJ5oJHrEmcBCsEytGQl+wtj++yvz2HVOay+gWJjHzQjKMeMApASP17bKDe8DuIcVS4SmO+3bFqToz4EXi5qSCcjT69kdvIGkSsgioIFp3XScGLyUKOBVsWuolmsWEjsmQdQ2NSMi0l86CT/GhUQY4MKcDGQGeqT83UhJqPQl9MxkSGOm/Xib+53UTCM69lEdxAiyi80NBIjBInLWAB1wxCmJiCKGKm6yYjogiFExXpVkJFxlOv19eJK3jqntSrd3UKvXLvI4i2kcH6Ai56AzV0TVqoCaiKEGP6Bm9WA/Wk/Vqvc1HC1a+s4d+wXr/AqU0kpM=</latexit>

v1
<latexit sha1_base64="24V4TYL3pELRQcm3g3L1rdPV4y8=">AAAB6nicbVBNS8NAEJ3Ur1q/qh69LBbBU0m0VL0VvXisaD+gDWWz3bRLN5uwuymU0J/gxYMiXv1F3vw3btIgan0w8Hhvhpl5XsSZ0rb9aRVWVtfWN4qbpa3tnd298v5BW4WxJLRFQh7KrocV5UzQlmaa024kKQ48Tjve5Cb1O1MqFQvFg55F1A3wSDCfEayNdD8dOINyxa7aGdAycXJSgRzNQfmjPwxJHFChCcdK9Rw70m6CpWaE03mpHysaYTLBI9ozVOCAKjfJTp2jE6MMkR9KU0KjTP05keBAqVngmc4A67H666Xif14v1v6lmzARxZoKsljkxxzpEKV/oyGTlGg+MwQTycytiIyxxESbdEpZCFcp6t8vL5P2WdU5r9buapXGdR5HEY7gGE7BgQtowC00oQUERvAIz/BicevJerXeFq0FK585hF+w3r8AIb6N1g==</latexit>

v2 · · · · · · vn
<latexit sha1_base64="1DuaMldMYSGwnuUayY1NqaaVHl4=">AAAB7XicbVDLSsNAFL2pr1pfVZdugkVwVRItPnZFNy4r2Ae0oUwmk3bsZCbMTIQS+g9uXCji1v9x5984SYOo9cCFwzn3cu89fsyo0o7zaZWWlldW18rrlY3Nre2d6u5eR4lEYtLGggnZ85EijHLS1lQz0oslQZHPSNefXGd+94FIRQW/09OYeBEacRpSjLSROgMcCK2G1ZpTd3LYi8QtSA0KtIbVj0EgcBIRrjFDSvVdJ9ZeiqSmmJFZZZAoEiM8QSPSN5SjiCgvza+d2UdGCexQSFNc27n6cyJFkVLTyDedEdJj9dfLxP+8fqLDCy+lPE404Xi+KEyYrYWdvW4HVBKs2dQQhCU1t9p4jCTC2gRUyUO4zHD2/fIi6ZzU3dN647ZRa14VcZThAA7hGFw4hybcQAvagOEeHuEZXixhPVmv1tu8tWQVM/vwC9b7F8dxj2c=</latexit>

<latexit sha1_base64="1DuaMldMYSGwnuUayY1NqaaVHl4=">AAAB7XicbVDLSsNAFL2pr1pfVZdugkVwVRItPnZFNy4r2Ae0oUwmk3bsZCbMTIQS+g9uXCji1v9x5984SYOo9cCFwzn3cu89fsyo0o7zaZWWlldW18rrlY3Nre2d6u5eR4lEYtLGggnZ85EijHLS1lQz0oslQZHPSNefXGd+94FIRQW/09OYeBEacRpSjLSROgMcCK2G1ZpTd3LYi8QtSA0KtIbVj0EgcBIRrjFDSvVdJ9ZeiqSmmJFZZZAoEiM8QSPSN5SjiCgvza+d2UdGCexQSFNc27n6cyJFkVLTyDedEdJj9dfLxP+8fqLDCy+lPE404Xi+KEyYrYWdvW4HVBKs2dQQhCU1t9p4jCTC2gRUyUO4zHD2/fIi6ZzU3dN647ZRa14VcZThAA7hGFw4hybcQAvagOEeHuEZXixhPVmv1tu8tWQVM/vwC9b7F8dxj2c=</latexit>

<latexit sha1_base64="nftV+Shkx3fR9ZGLDtlHVRA4J4U=">AAAB6nicbVBNS8NAEJ3Ur1q/qh69LBbBU0m0VL0VvXisaD+gDWWz3bRLN5uwuymU0J/gxYMiXv1F3vw3btIgan0w8Hhvhpl5XsSZ0rb9aRVWVtfWN4qbpa3tnd298v5BW4WxJLRFQh7KrocV5UzQlmaa024kKQ48Tjve5Cb1O1MqFQvFg55F1A3wSDCfEayNdD8diEG5YlftDGiZODmpQI7moPzRH4YkDqjQhGOleo4daTfBUjPC6bzUjxWNMJngEe0ZKnBAlZtkp87RiVGGyA+lKaFRpv6cSHCg1CzwTGeA9Vj99VLxP68Xa//STZiIYk0FWSzyY450iNK/0ZBJSjSfGYKJZOZWRMZYYqJNOqUshKsU9e+Xl0n7rOqcV2t3tUrjOo+jCEdwDKfgwAU04Baa0AICI3iEZ3ixuPVkvVpvi9aClc8cwi9Y719+Mo4T</latexit>

<latexit sha1_base64="x02KcIp0bqaKu7pIQWZ3u5fgUUI=">AAAB6nicbVDLSsNAFL2pr1pfVZduBovgqiS1+NgV3bisaB/QhjKZTtqhk0mYmRRK6Ce4caGIW7/InX/jJA2i1gMXDufcy733eBFnStv2p1VYWV1b3yhulra2d3b3yvsHbRXGktAWCXkoux5WlDNBW5ppTruRpDjwOO14k5vU70ypVCwUD3oWUTfAI8F8RrA20v10UBuUK3bVzoCWiZOTCuRoDsof/WFI4oAKTThWqufYkXYTLDUjnM5L/VjRCJMJHtGeoQIHVLlJduocnRhliPxQmhIaZerPiQQHSs0Cz3QGWI/VXy8V//N6sfYv3YSJKNZUkMUiP+ZIhyj9Gw2ZpETzmSGYSGZuRWSMJSbapFPKQrhKcf798jJp16rOWbV+V680rvM4inAEx3AKDlxAA26hCS0gMIJHeIYXi1tP1qv1tmgtWPnMIfyC9f4FI0KN1w==</latexit>

pre-commit p
<latexit sha1_base64="Fpx2ypxpVibckpip9jJVJmieRYw=">AAAB/XicbVDLSgMxFM3UV62v8bFzEyyCG8uMFh+7ohuXFewD2lIyadqGJjNDckesQ/FX3LhQxK3/4c6/MTMdRK0HAodz7uHeHC8UXIPjfFq5ufmFxaX8cmFldW19w97cqusgUpTVaCAC1fSIZoL7rAYcBGuGihHpCdbwRpeJ37hlSvPAv4FxyDqSDHze55SAkbr2ThvYHcQmc0gDKTngCQ67dtEpOSnwLHEzUkQZql37o90LaCSZD1QQrVuuE0InJgo4FWxSaEeahYSOyIC1DPWJZLoTp9dP8L5RergfKPN8wKn6MxETqfVYemZSEhjqv14i/ue1IuifdWLuhxEwn04X9SOBIcBJFbjHFaMgxoYQqri5FdMhUYSCKayQlnCe4OT7y7OkflRyj0vl63KxcpHVkUe7aA8dIBedogq6QlVUQxTdo0f0jF6sB+vJerXepqM5K8tso1+w3r8AlqmVcQ==</latexit>

XB
<latexit sha1_base64="Pn+Xj6/C8+M7gv+37i2P1DW8Dg0=">AAAB7HicbVBNS8NAEJ34WetX1aOXxSJ4sSRa/LiVevFYwbSFNpTNdtMu3WzC7kYoob/BiwdFvPqDvPlv3KRB1Ppg4PHeDDPz/JgzpW3701paXlldWy9tlDe3tnd2K3v7bRUlklCXRDySXR8rypmgrmaa024sKQ59Tjv+5CbzOw9UKhaJez2NqRfikWABI1gbye0OmqfxoFK1a3YOtEicglShQGtQ+egPI5KEVGjCsVI9x461l2KpGeF0Vu4nisaYTPCI9gwVOKTKS/NjZ+jYKEMURNKU0ChXf06kOFRqGvqmM8R6rP56mfif10t0cOWlTMSJpoLMFwUJRzpC2edoyCQlmk8NwUQycysiYywx0Safch7CdYaL75cXSfus5pzX6nf1aqNZxFGCQziCE3DgEhpwCy1wgQCDR3iGF0tYT9ar9TZvXbKKmQP4Bev9C0fCjno=</latexit>
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Fig. 2: Scenario 1: Symmetric valuations. (a) Player B pre-commits to a single battlefield of its choice. Our results
establish that a pre-commitment to a single battlefield is preferable over pre-commitments to multiple battlefields
of the same total value (Lemma 2.1). We thus seek necessary and sufficient conditions for which pre-committing to
a single battlefield is beneficial for some set of valuations v. (b) Parameter regimes where a player has an incentive
to pre-commit (blue regions), i.e. to outperform its equilibrium payoff in the nominal GL game (Result 1). In this
example, the value of the battlefield that B can pre-commit to is restricted to not exceed 0.55. Here, we consider
any set of valuations v whose total value is fixed to one. A full characterization of regions is given in Theorem 2.1.
Incentives only exist when the pre-committing player is stronger than its opponent. (c) The percent improvement
in payoff that pre-commitments offer to player B over playing the nominal GL game, as a function of the enemy’s
budget XA (tracing out parameters of the dotted vertical line in (b)). Here, the pre-committing player’s budget is
fixed to XB = 3. Pre-committing can never outperform the nominal payoff when the player is weaker (XB < XA ).

a General Lotto game where valuations are symmetric across players. In the second scenario,
players are engaged in a General Lotto game where the battlefield valuations are asymmetric
and relatively different across players.
Scenario 1 – Symmetric battlefield valuations: Here, the battlefield valuations are symmetric
across players, i.e. vA,b = vB,b for all b ∈ B. Player B has the option to pre-commit (see Figure
1b) in the fashion described in Section I-B. We are concerned with identifying conditions for
which player B has an incentive to pre-commit. Specifically, we seek necessary and sufficient
conditions on the players’ budgets XA , XB for which there exists a beneficial pre-commitment
for player B on some vector v of battlefield valuations.
Our analysis first establishes that these conditions can be narrowed to identifying whether a
pre-commitment to a single battlefield can be beneficial. Indeed, we show a pre-commitment to
a single battlefield of value v is preferable over a pre-commitment to multiple battlefields whose
total value is v (Lemma 2.1), given the cumulative value of the remaining battlefields in both
scenarios are equivalent. The main highlight of our first set of results is given below, where we
refer to the weaker (stronger) player as the one with the smaller (larger) resource endowment.
Result 1. In the General Lotto game with symmetric valuations, player B never has an incentive
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to pre-commit resources if it is the weaker player. However, player B can have incentives to
pre-commit if it is the stronger player.
Theorem 2.1 identifies necessary and sufficient conditions on parameters for the existence
of beneficial pre-commitments. These conditions also assert that the value of the battlefield(s)
that player B pre-commits to must exceed a certain threshold that depends on XA and XB .
Thus, if restrictions are placed on the total value that B can pre-commit to, there may not exist
incentives to pre-commit for any valuation vector v. Note that when no such restrictions are
placed, player B can secure the entire set of battlefields through pre-commitments if XB > nXA ,
or if XB > XA and there is only a single battlefield that is contested.
We also find that any beneficial pre-commitment forces player A to withdraw, i.e. by precommitting more than XA resources to a battlefield. Figure 2b depicts an example showing
regions of the parameters XA , XB where there exist beneficial pre-commitments for some valuation vector v, under the restriction that the total value that B pre-commits to does not exceed
0.55 · ∥v∥1 . Figure 2c shows the improvement factor that an optimal pre-commitment offers, i.e.
the best percent payoff gain over not pre-committing at all, over all possible valuations v. The
main conclusion from the analysis of Scenario 1 is that a weaker player would never pre-commit
resources.
Scenario 2 – Asymmetric battlefield valuations: In this scenario, the battlefield valuations are
asymmetric and relatively different across players. We will focus on a particular two-battlefield
setup where player A’s valuation of the first battlefield is vA,1 = α ∈ (0, 1/2], and player B’s
valuation is vB,1 = 1 − α. The valuations are reversed on the second battlefield, i.e. vA,2 = 1 − α
and vB,2 = α (Figure 3a). Valuations asymmetries in Lotto games were studied in [17], where
the authors termed this broader class of games as “Generalized” GL games. We thus denote our
particular settings concisely with GGL(XA , XB , α).
The equilibria of Generalized GL games have been characterized by Kovenock and Roberson
[17]. In particular, multiple payoff-distinct equilibria can arise, as players’ relative valuations of
battlefields can differ. Such equilibria in general are difficult to express, however, because they
correspond to the zeros of a piece-wise continuous cubic polynomial.
Because multiple payoff-distinct equilibria can arise in the underlying GGL game, the criteria
to evaluate whether pre-commitments offer any benefit differs from the criteria in Scenario
1. Our results (details in Theorem 3.1) identify necessary and sufficient conditions on pa-
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GGL game

GGL game
with pre-commitment
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Fig. 3: Scenario 2: Asymmetric valuations. (a) The left diagram is the game GGL(XA , XB , α) under consideration.
The right diagram shows the scenario where B has the option to pre-commit resources to a battlefield. After the
opponent’s response, they play a GL game on the remaining battlefield. (b) Parameter regions where a player in the
GGL game has an incentive to pre-commit, based on two different criteria. The green region indicates parameters
where there is a unique equilibrium payoff of the underlying GGL game, and there are beneficial pre-commitments
that exceed this payoff. In the blue region, the GGL game admits multiple equilibria, and pre-commitments can
exceed the second-highest equilibrium payoff (Theorem 3.1). Multiple equilibria arise in the red region, but no
such pre-commitments exist. Observe that in this setting, incentives exist for a weaker player (blue region), whereas
this was never the case for symmetric valuations. (c) The equilibrium payoffs to player B in the nominal (no
pre-commitments) GGL game (traces out parameters of the dotted vertical line in (b)). The GGL game admits three
equilibria in the blue and red regions, and the payoffs are ranked from best to worst for B. The dashed green
line indicates the best payoff attainable from a pre-commitment. In this example, we note that it exceeds the best
equilibrium payoff by an insignificant margin for XA ∈ [0, 2.5] (approximately). However, it can improve upon the
second-highest equilibrium payoff by up to 20%.

rameters for which pre-committing can outperform the second-highest equilibrium payoff of
GGL(XA , XB , α).
Result 2. In the General Lotto game with asymmetric valuations, pre-commitments can offer
improvement over the second-highest equilibrium payoff in instances that admit multiple payoffdistinct equilibria. These incentives exist when the pre-committing player is either weaker or
stronger. Furthermore, there are instances admitting a unique equilibrium where pre-committing
offers improvement for a weaker player.
A weaker player can have incentives to pre-commit when valuations are asymmetric, but it
never has incentives when valuations are symmetric (Result 1). Because valuations are asymmetric across players, a pre-commitment to the 1 − α battlefield can ensure the opponent does not
devote any resources to the more valuable battlefield. The opponent is more likely to withdraw
from such a pre-commitment because it is on its non-priority battlefield worth only α. Though our
results focus on a two battlefield setting, the intuition suggests that beneficial pre-commitments
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can exist for the same reasons in more general settings.
Figure 3b illustrates parameter regions where pre-commitments offer benefits over the secondhighest equilibrium payoff when multiple equilibria exist, and over the unique equilibrium
when only one exists. Figure 3c shows equilibrium payoffs in the GGL game, and the relative
benefits that pre-committing offers. The improvement factor over the best equilibrium, however,
is insignificant (usually up to a 1% improvement). Nonetheless, this suggests that pre-committing
can serve as a mechanism to avoid low equilibrium payoffs in the nominal GGL game. That
is, one can guarantee a payoff close to the best equilibrium payoff by pre-committing, whereas
there is no such guarantee if players engage in the nominal GGL game.
D. Related literature
A primary line of research in Colonel Blotto games focuses on characterizing its equilibria.
Since Borel’s initial study [21], many works have advanced this thread over the last one hundred
years [13], [17], [22], [25], [28]–[30]. As such, there are several variants of the Colonel Blotto
game. The General Lotto game has been studied extensively [14]–[17], and equilibria can be
characterized for all instances. Due to its tractability, the General Lotto game, as well as other
variants, are often adopted to study more complex adversarial environments. For instance, they
have been used in engineering domains such as network security [18], [20], [31] and the security
of cyber-physical systems [19], [32].
Informational elements in Colonel Blotto and General Lotto games constitute a significant
theme in the literature. Our work is closest to an area that concerns similarly sequenced Blotto
and Lotto games. In particular, [27] introduced a two-vs-one model, and identified when a
(public) unilateral transfer of resources between coalitional players is beneficial. Subsequent
work in [32], [33] considers similar settings where the two players can decide to add battlefields
in addition to transferring resources amongst each other. Counter-intuitively, they showed that
the players in the coalition achieve better performance if the transfers are made public to their
adversary. Previous studies focused on settings where endogenously adding battlefields is costly
[34]. Pre-committing resources was considered in [35], but in a different context that involves
favoritism. There, they studied a one-shot Blotto game with resources that are pre-allocated
non-strategically to the battlefields.
Incomplete information settings pertaining to payoff-relevant parameters in zero-sum games
has received attention in recent years. The computation of security strategies in repeated, asym-
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metric information zero-sum games characterizes the balance of revealing private information
through one’s actions over time [10], [11], [36]. In Blotto and Lotto games, several papers
study one-shot settings where players have uncertainty about each other’s resource budgets.
In [37], the players’ budgets are random variables drawn from a common distribution, and
each player holds private information only about their own budget. Another recent formulation
characterizes asymmetric Bayes-Nash equilibria when one player does not have knowledge
about the opponent’s budget, but its own budget is common knowledge [38]. Uncertainty about
battlefield valuations has also been featured in the literature [39]–[41].
II. P RE - COMMITMENTS WITH SYMMETRIC VALUATIONS
In this section, we seek conditions on the players’ resource budgets XA , XB for which one
of the players has incentives to pre-commit resources in GL games with symmetric valuations.
We begin with a basic primer on their equilibria.
A. Primer on equilibria in GL games
The two-player General Lotto game GL(XA , XB , v) always admits a unique equilibrium
payoff, which is given as follows.
Fact 2.1. The equilibrium payoff to player i ∈ {A, B} in the game GL(XA , XB , v) is πinom :=
ϕ · L(Xi , X−i ), where
L(Xi , X−i ) :=





Xi
2X−i


1 −
and ϕ :=

P

b∈B

if 0 < Xi ≤ X−i
X−i
2Xi

(2)

if Xi > X−i .

nom
vb . The equilibrium payoff to player −i is π−i
= ϕ(1 − L(Xi , X−i )).

An admissible strategy for i ∈ {A, B} is any n-variate distribution Fi over Rn+ that satisfies
the budget constraint in expectation (1). The equilibrium strategies for the GL game are detailed
below.
Fact 2.2 (GL equilibrium strategies [16], [17]). Suppose player i ∈ {A, B} is the stronger
player, i.e. Xi ≥ X−i . Then the players’ equilibrium marginal (cumulative) distribution on
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resource allocation for battlefield b ∈ B is given by
x
, x ∈ [0, 2Xi vb )
2Xi vb
X−i
X−i
F−i,b (x) = 1 −
+
x, x ∈ [0, 2Xi vb )
Xi
2Xi2 vb
Fi,b (x) =

(3)

The stronger player uses uniform distributions on allocations for each battlefield, and the
weaker player uses uniform distributions with the same support, but combined with a point mass
at zero. In essence, the stronger player competes more aggressively on each battlefield because
the weaker player “gives up” on each battlefield independently with probability 1 −

X−i
.
Xi

In the forthcoming analysis on pre-commitments in GL games, we will not need to make explicit use of the details of Fact 2.2 since we are concerned only with the associated payoffs in the
sequence of events outlined in Section I-B. Our results thus rely heavily on the characterization
of equilibrium payoffs in (2).
B. Beneficial pre-commitments in GL games
Recall the pre-commitment model of Section I-B (depicted in Figure 1b). Here, we assume
P
that any valuation vector v has a fixed total value ϕ = b∈B vb , and we denote V as the set of
P
all such valuation vectors. Suppose there is also a restriction b∈P vb ≤ v̄ imposed on the total
value of the battlefields P that B can pre-commit to, where v̄ ∈ [0, ϕ] is a fixed and exogenous
parameter. We will refer to v̄ as the limit value.
Player A observes the pre-commitment strategy p. For each battlefield b ∈ P, A must decide
either to match the pre-commitment with pb of its own resources – thus securing the value
vb for itself – or to withdraw from battlefield b entirely. After A makes a response for each
battlefield b ∈ P, both players then engage in a GL game with their remaining resources over
the remaining set of battlefields B\P. Specifically, if player A decides to match pre-commitments
on battlefields M ⊆ P, it obtains the payoff
uA,M (p; v) := vM + (ϕ − vM ) · L(XA − pM , XB − pP )
where we henceforth denote vS =

P

b∈S

vb and pS =

P

b∈S

(4)

pb for any subset S ⊆ B. If M = ∅,

then vM = 0 and pM = 0. If pb > XA , then A cannot match the pre-commitment and is forced
to withdraw from battlefield b. We assume player A makes an optimal response to p and obtains
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the subsequent payoff
uA (p; v) := max {uA,M (p; v) : pM ≤ XA } .
M⊆P

(5)

Player B then obtains the subsequent payoff uB (p; v) := ϕ − uA (p; v). Alternatively, player
B has the option to not pre-commit at all, wherein both players simply engage in the nominal
game GL(XA , XB , v) in simultaneous play over the full set of battlefields B. Under this option,
the players derive the equilibrium payoffs πinom = ϕ · L(Xi , X−i ) from (2).
We are interested in identifying conditions on the budgets XA , XB and on the limit value v̄
for which player B has an incentive to pre-commit. A formal definition of when an incentive
exists is given below.
Definition 1. We say player B has an incentive to pre-commit if there exists a subset P ⊆ B
P
satisfying b∈P vb ≤ v̄, and a pre-commitment p such that uB (p; v) > πBnom for some set of
battlefield valuations v ∈ V.
The following lemma establishes that player B weakly prefers to pre-commit to a single highvalue battlefield than to many battlefields whose total value is the same as the single battlefield.
Lemma 2.1. Consider any instance of battlefield valuations v ∈ V. For any pre-commitment p

on a subset P ⊆ B of battlefields (satisfying vP ≤ v̄), there is a pre-commitment p′ ∈ [0, XB ] to

a single battlefield of value vP that belongs to a corresponding set of valuations v ′ ∈ V such
that
uB (p; v) ≤ uB (p′ ; v ′ ).

(6)

Proof. If player A’s optimal response is to match or withdraw on all battlefields b ∈ P, then

consider an instance v ′ ∈ V where one of its battlefields has value vP . The pre-commitment pP

to this single battlefield elicits the same response and hence identical payoffs. If A’s optimal
response is not to match or withdraw on all b ∈ P, then we can focus exclusively on the
case |P| = 2. To see this, suppose player A’s optimal response is to match on a subset M ⊂

P. Consider another instance of battlefields v ′ where v1′ = vM and v2′ = vP\M , and a pre-

commitment (p′1 , p′2 ) = (pM , pP\M ). Player A’s optimal response is to match on v1′ and withdraw

on v2′ , giving the same subsequent payoff uB (p; v).
So, let us consider a pre-commitment p = (p1 , p2 ) to v. Suppose A’s optimal response is to
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match v1 and to withdraw from v2 (w.o.l.o.g). First, let us assume that p1 + p2 > XA , so that A
cannot match on both battlefields. Here, B is necessarily the stronger player. From optimality
of A’s response, it holds that
(ϕ − v1 − v2 ) · L(XA , XB − p1 − p2 ) ≤ uA (p; v)

(7)

In words, matching only on v1 outperforms withdrawing from both v1 and v2 . Let us consider an
instance with a set of battlefields v ′ , where v1′ = v1 + v2 . The pre-commitment p′ = p1 + p2 only
on the first battlefield forces player A to withdraw from v1′ , since p1 + p2 > XA . The subsequent
payoff is uA (p′ ; v ′ ) = (ϕ − v1 − v2 ) · L(XA , XB − p1 − p2 ), and from (7) we obtain
uB (p; v) ≤ uB (p′ ; v ′ ).

(8)

Now, let us assume that p1 + p2 ≤ XA , and suppose A’s optimal response is to match v1 and
to withdraw from v2 . Let us define f (s) = uA,{1} (p1 , s) and g(s) = uA,{1,2} (p1 , s) for s ≥ 0.
The value f (s) is the payoff A obtains from matching v1 and withdrawing from v2 against the
pre-commitment (p1 , s). It is a strictly increasing function of s. The value g(s) is the payoff A
obtains from matching both pre-commitments, and is a strictly decreasing function of s. Note
that f and g are continuous in s, and that g(0) > f (0). By the assumption of A’s optimal
response to p = (p1 , p2 ), we have f (p2 ) ≥ g(p2 ). Also, from the assumption that p2 < XA ,
the function max{f (s), g(s)} is continuous on s ∈ [0, p2 ]. Hence, there exists a unique precommitment p∗2 ∈ [0, p2 ] for which f (p∗2 ) = g(p∗2 ), making A indifferent between matching and
withdrawing on the second battlefield. Since p∗2 ≤ p2 , we have

uA (p1 , p∗2 ; v) = f (p∗2 ) ≤ f (p2 ) = uA (p1 , p2 ; v)

(9)

and we obtain uB (p1 , p∗2 ; v) ≥ uB (p1 , p2 ; v). In words, player B can weakly improve its payoff
by lowering its pre-commitment to the second battlefield down to p∗2 , whereupon an optimal

response for A is to match both pre-commitments. Let us consider an instance with a set of
battlefields v ′ where v1′ = v1 + v2 , and a pre-commitment p′ = p1 + p∗2 only on v1′ . It follows that
player A’s optimal response is to match, where it derives the payoff uA (p′ ; v ′ ) = uA (p1 , p∗2 ; v).
From (9), we obtain uB (p1 , p2 ; v) ≤ uB (p′ ; v ′ ).

■

Lemma 2.1 implies that if there are no incentives to pre-commit to a single battlefield of any
value up to the limit v̄ on any set of valuations v ∈ V, then there is no incentive to pre-commit to
November 20, 2021

DRAFT

14

(a)

(b)

Fig. 4: (a) Full parameter region (in green) where there exists beneficial pre-commitments in GL(XA , XB , v) (from
Theorem 2.1). Here, we set ϕ = 1. (b,c) These diagrams depict regions of player A’s optimal response against any
pre-commitment p ∈ [0, XB ] on a single battlefield of value vb ∈ [0, ϕ] (suppose v̄ = ϕ here), and the total value
of battlefields is ϕ. (b) When XA < XB < 2XA , there is an incentive to pre-commit to a single battlefield b if and
XA /XB
)ϕ (green region). The set of beneficial pre-commitments are shown as the shaded green
only if vb > (1 − 3−X
B /XA
region. The exact analytical characterizations of the border lines are given in the proof of Theorem 2.1 (Appendix).

multiple battlefields with total value up to v̄. In seeking conditions that give player B incentives
to pre-commit, we can thus simplify the analysis by narrowing the focus to single battlefield precommitments. The following result thus provides necessary and sufficient conditions on XA , XB ,
and v̄ for which incentives to pre-commit exist on some valuation vector v ∈ V.
Theorem 2.1. If XB < XA , then there is never an incentive for player B to pre-commit resources.
If XA ≤ XB < 2XA , then player B has incentives to pre-commit resources if and only if
XA /XB
)ϕ. If XB ≥
3−XB /XA
XA
if v̄ > X
ϕ. Moreover,
B

v̄ > (1 −

2XA , then player B has incentives to pre-commit resources if

and only

any beneficial pre-commitment p to a single battlefield satisfies

p > XA .
The proof is provided in the Appendix. This result places necessary and sufficient conditions
on the limit value v̄ for which there exist instances that offer incentives to pre-commit. That
is, a stronger player has incentives to pre-commit, provided that the value of the battlefield it
pre-commits to is sufficiently high and is within the limit value v̄. Note that this result does
not immediately imply that there exist beneficial pre-commitments to an arbitrary subset of
battlefields whose total value satisfies this condition. Figure 4 illustrates the parameter region
where pre-commitments are beneficial. Interestingly, the minimum value of vb for which there
exist beneficial pre-commitments is not monotonic in the budget ratio γ = XB /XA . It is
increasing on γ ∈ (1, 23 ), taking a maximum value of 59 ϕ at γ = 32 , and decreasing on γ ∈ ( 23 , ∞)
(Figure 4a). Moreover, the minimum vb is at least ϕ/2 when XA < XB < 2XA . Player B must

November 20, 2021

DRAFT

15

Two
battlefields

Single
battlefield

XA = 1

XA = 1

<latexit sha1_base64="/dfYaslckSS0IX39BGrPQDgUKaQ=">AAAB8XicbVDLSsNAFJ3UV62vqks3wSK4KokWH7uiG5cV+sI2lMl00g6dzISZG7WE/oUbF4q49W/c+TdO0iC+Dlw4nHMv997jR5xpcJwPq7CwuLS8Ulwtra1vbG6Vt3faWsaK0BaRXKqujzXlTNAWMOC0GymKQ5/Tjj+5TP3OLVWaSdGEaUS9EI8ECxjBYKSbPtB7SJp3cjYoV5yqk8H+S9ycVFCOxqD83h9KEodUAOFY657rROAlWAEjnM5K/VjTCJMJHtGeoQKHVHtJdvHMPjDK0A6kMiXAztTvEwkOtZ6GvukMMYz1by8V//N6MQRnXsJEFAMVZL4oiLkN0k7ft4dMUQJ8aggmiplbbTLGChMwIZWyEM5TnHy9/Je0j6rucbV2XavUL/I4imgP7aND5KJTVEdXqIFaiCCBHtATera09Wi9WK/z1oKVz+yiH7DePgE2+5Fp</latexit>

<latexit sha1_base64="ER6/haqkkH7pWRZh6uBzz2NirR4=">AAAB9HicbVDLSsNAFJ3UV62vqks3g0VwVRItPnZFNy4rWltoQ5lMJ+3QySTO3BRL6He4caGIWz/GnX/jJA2i1gMXDufcO3Pv8SLBNdj2p1VYWFxaXimultbWNza3yts7dzqMFWVNGopQtT2imeCSNYGDYO1IMRJ4grW80WXqt8ZMaR7KW5hEzA3IQHKfUwJGcrvAHiC54XIg2LRXrthVOwOeJ05OKihHo1f+6PZDGgdMAhVE645jR+AmRAGn5r1SN9YsInREBqxjqCQB026SLT3FB0bpYz9UpiTgTP05kZBA60ngmc6AwFD/9VLxP68Tg3/mJlxGMTBJZx/5scAQ4jQB3OeKURATQwhV3OyK6ZAoQsHkVMpCOE9x8n3yPLk7qjrH1dp1rVK/yOMooj20jw6Rg05RHV2hBmoiiu7RI3pGL9bYerJerbdZa8HKZ3bRL1jvX3RFkq8=</latexit>

<latexit sha1_base64="Fyumv1W7JA3nqDXN0WPSvz1C4Ic=">AAAB+3icbVDLSsNAFJ3UV62vWpdugkVwVRItPnZFNy4r2Ae0pUwmN+3QySTM3EhL6K+4caGIW3/EnX/jNC2i1gMDh3Pu4d45Xiy4Rsf5tHIrq2vrG/nNwtb2zu5ecb/U1FGiGDRYJCLV9qgGwSU0kKOAdqyAhp6Alje6mfmtB1CaR/IeJzH0QjqQPOCMopH6xVIXYYypR9FEAw7Cn/aLZafiZLCXibsgZbJAvV/86PoRS0KQyATVuuM6MfZSqpAzAdNCN9EQUzaiA+gYKmkIupdmt0/tY6P4dhAp8yTamfozkdJQ60nomcmQ4lD/9Wbif14nweCyl3IZJwiSzRcFibAxsmdF2D5XwFBMDKFMcXOrzYZUUYamrkJWwtUM599fXibN04p7VqneVcu160UdeXJIjsgJcckFqZFbUicNwsiYPJJn8mJNrSfr1Xqbj+asReaA/IL1/gX7AZUw</latexit>

<latexit sha1_base64="Mg3haV3wqzaw3Gk3sPeIXgztIYg=">AAAB/HicbVDLSsNAFJ3UV62vaJdugkVwVVItPnZFNy4r2Ae0oUymN+3QyYOZG7GE+ituXCji1g9x5984SYOo9cDA4Zx7uHeOGwmu0LY/jcLS8srqWnG9tLG5tb1j7u61VRhLBi0WilB2XapA8ABayFFAN5JAfVdAx51cpX7nDqTiYXCL0wgcn44C7nFGUUsDs9xHuMfEpaijHgcxVLOBWbGrdgZrkdRyUiE5mgPzoz8MWexDgExQpXo1O0InoRI5EzAr9WMFEWUTOoKepgH1QTlJdvzMOtTK0PJCqV+AVqb+TCTUV2rqu3rSpzhWf71U/M/rxeidOwkPohghYPNFXiwsDK20CWvIJTAUU00ok1zfarExlZSh7quUlXCR4vT7y4ukfVytnVTrN/VK4zKvo0j2yQE5IjVyRhrkmjRJizAyJY/kmbwYD8aT8Wq8zUcLRp4pk18w3r8A1hCVrQ==</latexit>

<latexit sha1_base64="K3LhBXP24b+Nhj8yXp4pEQoEv2c=">AAAB7nicbVBNS8NAEJ3Ur1q/qh69LBbBU0m0VD0IVS8eK9gPaEPZbDft0s0m7G6EEvojvHhQxKu/x5v/xk0aRK0PBh7vzTAzz4s4U9q2P63C0vLK6lpxvbSxubW9U97da6swloS2SMhD2fWwopwJ2tJMc9qNJMWBx2nHm9ykfueBSsVCca+nEXUDPBLMZwRrI3W6gyt0iZxBuWJX7QxokTg5qUCO5qD80R+GJA6o0IRjpXqOHWk3wVIzwums1I8VjTCZ4BHtGSpwQJWbZOfO0JFRhsgPpSmhUab+nEhwoNQ08ExngPVY/fVS8T+vF2v/3E2YiGJNBZkv8mOOdIjS39GQSUo0nxqCiWTmVkTGWGKiTUKlLISLFPXvlxdJ+6TqnFZrd7VK4zqPowgHcAjH4MAZNOAWmtACAhN4hGd4sSLryXq13uatBSuf2YdfsN6/AKyXjp4=</latexit>

80%
0.8

<latexit sha1_base64="K3LhBXP24b+Nhj8yXp4pEQoEv2c=">AAAB7nicbVBNS8NAEJ3Ur1q/qh69LBbBU0m0VD0IVS8eK9gPaEPZbDft0s0m7G6EEvojvHhQxKu/x5v/xk0aRK0PBh7vzTAzz4s4U9q2P63C0vLK6lpxvbSxubW9U97da6swloS2SMhD2fWwopwJ2tJMc9qNJMWBx2nHm9ykfueBSsVCca+nEXUDPBLMZwRrI3W6gyt0iZxBuWJX7QxokTg5qUCO5qD80R+GJA6o0IRjpXqOHWk3wVIzwums1I8VjTCZ4BHtGSpwQJWbZOfO0JFRhsgPpSmhUab+nEhwoNQ08ExngPVY/fVS8T+vF2v/3E2YiGJNBZkv8mOOdIjS39GQSUo0nxqCiWTmVkTGWGKiTUKlLISLFPXvlxdJ+6TqnFZrd7VK4zqPowgHcAjH4MAZNOAWmtACAhN4hGd4sSLryXq13uatBSuf2YdfsN6/AKyXjp4=</latexit>

60%

random
sample

0.75

40%

0.7

20%

<latexit sha1_base64="c9T/94N8WYv/7tKA6sU3dzx+2uQ=">AAAB9HicbVDLSsNAFJ3UV62vqks3wSK4KqkWH7uiG5cV7APaUCaTSTt0HnHmplhCv8ONC0Xc+jHu/BuTNIhaD1w4nHMv997jhZwZcJxPq7C0vLK6VlwvbWxube+Ud/faRkWa0BZRXOmuhw3lTNIWMOC0G2qKhcdpxxtfp35nQrVhSt7BNKSuwEPJAkYwJJLbB/oAscbSV2I2KFecqpPBXiS1nFRQjuag/NH3FYkElUA4NqZXc0JwY6yBEU5npX5kaIjJGA9pL6ESC2rcODt6Zh8lim8HSiclwc7UnxMxFsZMhZd0Cgwj89dLxf+8XgTBhRszGUZAJZkvCiJug7LTBGyfaUqATxOCiWbJrTYZYY0JJDmVshAuU5x9v7xI2ifV2mm1fluvNK7yOIroAB2iY1RD56iBblATtRBB9+gRPaMXa2I9Wa/W27y1YOUz++gXrPcvo9iSzg==</latexit>

v1

<latexit sha1_base64="vIODhmvGI+khQz/2rsnwePfUI2w=">AAAB9HicbVDLSsNAFJ3UV62vqks3wSK4KokWH7uiG5cV7APaUCbTSTt0ZhJnbool9DvcuFDErR/jzr9xkgZR64ELh3Punbn3+BFnGhzn0yosLa+srhXXSxubW9s75d29lg5jRWiThDxUHR9rypmkTWDAaSdSFAuf07Y/vk799oQqzUJ5B9OIegIPJQsYwWAkrwf0ARKNRcTprF+uOFUng71I3JxUUI5Gv/zRG4QkFlQC4VjrrutE4CVYASPmvVIv1jTCZIyHtGuoxIJqL8mWntlHRhnYQahMSbAz9edEgoXWU+GbToFhpP96qfif140huPASJqMYqCTzj4KY2xDaaQL2gClKgE8NwUQxs6tNRlhhAianUhbCZYqz75MXSeuk6p5Wa7e1Sv0qj6OIDtAhOkYuOkd1dIMaqIkIukeP6Bm9WBPryXq13uatBSuf2Ue/YL1/AaV0ks8=</latexit>

v2

<latexit sha1_base64="24V4TYL3pELRQcm3g3L1rdPV4y8=">AAAB6nicbVBNS8NAEJ3Ur1q/qh69LBbBU0m0VL0VvXisaD+gDWWz3bRLN5uwuymU0J/gxYMiXv1F3vw3btIgan0w8Hhvhpl5XsSZ0rb9aRVWVtfWN4qbpa3tnd298v5BW4WxJLRFQh7KrocV5UzQlmaa024kKQ48Tjve5Cb1O1MqFQvFg55F1A3wSDCfEayNdD8dOINyxa7aGdAycXJSgRzNQfmjPwxJHFChCcdK9Rw70m6CpWaE03mpHysaYTLBI9ozVOCAKjfJTp2jE6MMkR9KU0KjTP05keBAqVngmc4A67H666Xif14v1v6lmzARxZoKsljkxxzpEKV/oyGTlGg+MwQTycytiIyxxESbdEpZCFcp6t8vL5P2WdU5r9buapXGdR5HEY7gGE7BgQtowC00oQUERvAIz/BicevJerXeFq0FK585hF+w3r8AIb6N1g==</latexit>

<latexit sha1_base64="Qj28VB2xuRs/PwX+LYT4vWHQ1rI=">AAAB6nicbVDLSsNAFL2pr1pfUZduBovgqiRafOyKblxWtA9oQ5lMJ+3QySTMTIQS+gluXCji1i9y5984SYOo9cCFwzn3cu89fsyZ0o7zaZWWlldW18rrlY3Nre0de3evraJEEtoiEY9k18eKciZoSzPNaTeWFIc+px1/cp35nQcqFYvEvZ7G1AvxSLCAEayNdBcP3IFddWpODrRI3IJUoUBzYH/0hxFJQio04VipnuvE2kux1IxwOqv0E0VjTCZ4RHuGChxS5aX5qTN0ZJQhCiJpSmiUqz8nUhwqNQ190xliPVZ/vUz8z+slOrjwUibiRFNB5ouChCMdoexvNGSSEs2nhmAimbkVkTGWmGiTTiUP4TLD2ffLi6R9UnNPa/XberVxVcRRhgM4hGNw4RwacANNaAGBETzCM7xY3HqyXq23eWvJKmb24Res9y8Ymo3Q</latexit>

p1

<latexit sha1_base64="x02KcIp0bqaKu7pIQWZ3u5fgUUI=">AAAB6nicbVDLSsNAFL2pr1pfVZduBovgqiS1+NgV3bisaB/QhjKZTtqhk0mYmRRK6Ce4caGIW7/InX/jJA2i1gMXDufcy733eBFnStv2p1VYWV1b3yhulra2d3b3yvsHbRXGktAWCXkoux5WlDNBW5ppTruRpDjwOO14k5vU70ypVCwUD3oWUTfAI8F8RrA20v10UBuUK3bVzoCWiZOTCuRoDsof/WFI4oAKTThWqufYkXYTLDUjnM5L/VjRCJMJHtGeoQIHVLlJduocnRhliPxQmhIaZerPiQQHSs0Cz3QGWI/VXy8V//N6sfYv3YSJKNZUkMUiP+ZIhyj9Gw2ZpETzmSGYSGZuRWSMJSbapFPKQrhKcf798jJp16rOWbV+V680rvM4inAEx3AKDlxAA26hCS0gMIJHeIYXi1tP1qv1tmgtWPnMIfyC9f4FI0KN1w==</latexit>

<latexit sha1_base64="KtNyJyhtT9P/tbTZQSXPd0AeJ1s=">AAAB6nicbVBNS8NAEJ3Ur1q/qh69LBbBU0lqqXorevFY0X5AG8pmu2mXbjZhdyOU0J/gxYMiXv1F3vw3btIgan0w8Hhvhpl5XsSZ0rb9aRVWVtfWN4qbpa3tnd298v5BR4WxJLRNQh7KnocV5UzQtmaa014kKQ48Trve9Dr1uw9UKhaKez2LqBvgsWA+I1gb6S4a1oblil21M6Bl4uSkAjlaw/LHYBSSOKBCE46V6jt2pN0ES80Ip/PSIFY0wmSKx7RvqMABVW6SnTpHJ0YZIT+UpoRGmfpzIsGBUrPAM50B1hP110vF/7x+rP0LN2EiijUVZLHIjznSIUr/RiMmKdF8ZggmkplbEZlgiYk26ZSyEC5TNL5fXiadWtU5q9Zv65XmVR5HEY7gGE7BgXNowg20oA0ExvAIz/BicevJerXeFq0FK585hF+w3r8AGh6N0Q==</latexit>

v3
<latexit sha1_base64="5/Quhr3jnXRF2gst2NZebtOI+D0=">AAAB6nicbVDLSsNAFL2pr1pfVZduBovgqiS2+NgV3bisaB/QhjKZTtqhk0mYmRRK6Ce4caGIW7/InX/jJA2i1gMXDufcy733eBFnStv2p1VYWV1b3yhulra2d3b3yvsHbRXGktAWCXkoux5WlDNBW5ppTruRpDjwOO14k5vU70ypVCwUD3oWUTfAI8F8RrA20v10UBuUK3bVzoCWiZOTCuRoDsof/WFI4oAKTThWqufYkXYTLDUjnM5L/VjRCJMJHtGeoQIHVLlJduocnRhliPxQmhIaZerPiQQHSs0Cz3QGWI/VXy8V//N6sfYv3YSJKNZUkMUiP+ZIhyj9Gw2ZpETzmSGYSGZuRWSMJSbapFPKQrhKcf798jJpn1WdWrV+V680rvM4inAEx3AKDlxAA26hCS0gMIJHeIYXi1tP1qv1tmgtWPnMIfyC9f4FJMaN2A==</latexit>

p2

v1 + v2
<latexit sha1_base64="vrtNkmoNDKH+ZeoEc96MEuOFs04=">AAAB7nicbVDLSsNAFL2pr1pfVZduBosgCCWpxceu6MZlBfuANoTJdNoOnUzCzKRQQj/CjQtF3Po97vwbJ2kQtR64cDjnXu69x484U9q2P63Cyura+kZxs7S1vbO7V94/aKswloS2SMhD2fWxopwJ2tJMc9qNJMWBz2nHn9ymfmdKpWKheNCziLoBHgk2ZARrI3WmnnM29WpeuWJX7QxomTg5qUCOplf+6A9CEgdUaMKxUj3HjrSbYKkZ4XRe6seKRphM8Ij2DBU4oMpNsnPn6MQoAzQMpSmhUab+nEhwoNQs8E1ngPVY/fVS8T+vF+vhlZswEcWaCrJYNIw50iFKf0cDJinRfGYIJpKZWxEZY4mJNgmVshCuU1x8v7xM2rWqc16t39crjZs8jiIcwTGcggOX0IA7aEILCEzgEZ7hxYqsJ+vVelu0Fqx85hB+wXr/Aos0jzA=</latexit>

<latexit sha1_base64="RgcwqcDU8r8C1JotkeXPclUsAZA=">AAAB6HicbVDJSgNBEK1xjXGLevTSGARPYUaDyy3oxWMCZoFkCD2dStKmZ6G7RwhDvsCLB0W8+kne/Bt7JoOo8UHB470qqup5keBK2/antbS8srq2Xtgobm5t7+yW9vZbKowlwyYLRSg7HlUoeIBNzbXATiSR+p7Atje5Sf32A0rFw+BOTyN0fToK+JAzqo3UiPqlsl2xM5BF4uSkDDnq/dJHbxCy2MdAM0GV6jp2pN2ESs2ZwFmxFyuMKJvQEXYNDaiPyk2yQ2fk2CgDMgylqUCTTP05kVBfqanvmU6f6rH666Xif1431sNLN+FBFGsM2HzRMBZEhyT9mgy4RKbF1BDKJDe3EjamkjJtsilmIVylOP9+eZG0TivOWaXaqJZr13kcBTiEIzgBBy6gBrdQhyYwQHiEZ3ix7q0n69V6m7cuWfnMAfyC9f4F8zONLA==</latexit>

v3
<latexit sha1_base64="5/Quhr3jnXRF2gst2NZebtOI+D0=">AAAB6nicbVDLSsNAFL2pr1pfVZduBovgqiS2+NgV3bisaB/QhjKZTtqhk0mYmRRK6Ce4caGIW7/InX/jJA2i1gMXDufcy733eBFnStv2p1VYWV1b3yhulra2d3b3yvsHbRXGktAWCXkoux5WlDNBW5ppTruRpDjwOO14k5vU70ypVCwUD3oWUTfAI8F8RrA20v10UBuUK3bVzoCWiZOTCuRoDsof/WFI4oAKTThWqufYkXYTLDUjnM5L/VjRCJMJHtGeoQIHVLlJduocnRhliPxQmhIaZerPiQQHSs0Cz3QGWI/VXy8V//N6sfYv3YSJKNZUkMUiP+ZIhyj9Gw2ZpETzmSGYSGZuRWSMJSbapFPKQrhKcf798jJpn1WdWrV+V680rvM4inAEx3AKDlxAA26hCS0gMIJHeIYXi1tP1qv1tmgtWPnMIfyC9f4FJMaN2A==</latexit>

p

0.5

XA = 1.5
<latexit sha1_base64="gaPLlCL/9jRo1k0u8LP4KW5UrCY=">AAAB8HicbVDLSsNAFL2pr1pfVZduBovgKiRaXwuh6sZlBfuQNpTJdNIOnUnCzEQooV/hxoUibv0cd/6Nk7SIrwMXDufcy733+DFnSjvOh1WYm19YXCoul1ZW19Y3yptbTRUlktAGiXgk2z5WlLOQNjTTnLZjSbHwOW35o6vMb91TqVgU3upxTD2BByELGMHaSHft3gU6R6591CtXHNvJgf4Sd0YqMEO9V37v9iOSCBpqwrFSHdeJtZdiqRnhdFLqJorGmIzwgHYMDbGgykvzgydozyh9FETSVKhRrn6fSLFQaix80ymwHqrfXib+53USHZx6KQvjRNOQTBcFCUc6Qtn3qM8kJZqPDcFEMnMrIkMsMdEmo1IewlmG46+X/5Lmge0e2tWbaqV2OYujCDuwC/vgwgnU4Brq0AACAh7gCZ4taT1aL9brtLVgzWa24Qest0+QDo8V</latexit>

XA = 1.5
<latexit sha1_base64="gaPLlCL/9jRo1k0u8LP4KW5UrCY=">AAAB8HicbVDLSsNAFL2pr1pfVZduBovgKiRaXwuh6sZlBfuQNpTJdNIOnUnCzEQooV/hxoUibv0cd/6Nk7SIrwMXDufcy733+DFnSjvOh1WYm19YXCoul1ZW19Y3yptbTRUlktAGiXgk2z5WlLOQNjTTnLZjSbHwOW35o6vMb91TqVgU3upxTD2BByELGMHaSHft3gU6R6591CtXHNvJgf4Sd0YqMEO9V37v9iOSCBpqwrFSHdeJtZdiqRnhdFLqJorGmIzwgHYMDbGgykvzgydozyh9FETSVKhRrn6fSLFQaix80ymwHqrfXib+53USHZx6KQvjRNOQTBcFCUc6Qtn3qM8kJZqPDcFEMnMrIkMsMdEmo1IewlmG46+X/5Lmge0e2tWbaqV2OYujCDuwC/vgwgnU4Brq0AACAh7gCZ4taT1aL9brtLVgzWa24Qest0+QDo8V</latexit>

0.6

0.7

(b)

0.8

0.9

1

0%
0.5

0.6

0.7

0.8

0.9

1

(c)

(a)

Fig. 5: (a) Diagram of our simulation setup. First, a random set of valuations v ∈ V (n = 3) is drawn from the
uniform distribution on V. We calculate the optimal two-battlefield pre-commitment to the first two battlefields.
We then calculated the optimal pre-commitment to a single battlefield of value v1 + v2 . Here, XB = 1.5 and
XA = 1. (b) We performed calculations on 500 independent samples of v (for each v̄ ranging from 0:0.05:1),
with ϕ = 1 and n = 3. This plot shows the average payoff obtained from pre-committing to a single battlefield
(blue) vs pre-committing to two battlefields (red). (c) This plot shows the percent of samples for which the optimal
pre-commitment provided benefits over the nominal payoff. Note that no benefits are available for any v̄ < 5/9
(Theorem 2.1).

pre-commit an amount of resources that exceeds player A’s budget in order to benefit.
C. Discussion and numerical studies
Even if the condition on the limit value v̄ in Theorem 2.1 is satisfied, there may not exist
any beneficial pre-commitment on a particular valuation vector v. Sometimes, pre-committing
to multiple battlefields is preferable over pre-committing to a single battlefield. For example,
consider three battlefields each with value 1/3, a limit value of v̄ = 1, XB > 3, and XA = 1.
A pre-commitment that places pb = XB /3 > XA on each battlefield secures the entire value
of 1, whereas a single pre-commitment cannot secure the entire value. Note this assertion is
different from Lemma 2.1, which establishes that any multi-battlefield pre-commitment weakly
under-performs a pre-commitment to a single battlefield on some instance of battlefields.
We conducted numerical studies to verify Lemma 2.1 and to compare the overall performance
of single battlefield pre-commitments to the performance of pre-commitments to two battlefields
in a three-battlefield setting with fixed total value ϕ = 1. The limit value is varied from 0 to 1. For
each particular limit value, we sampled 500 valuations v uniformly from V. For each sample, we
evaluated the best pre-commitment (p1 , p2 ) to the first two battlefields. In addition, we evaluated
the best pre-commitment to a single battlefield of value v1 + v2 , i.e. on a corresponding set
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of valuations v ′ with two battlefields v1′ = v1 + v2 and v2′ = v3 . On average, single battlefield
pre-commitments significantly outperform pre-commitments to two battlefields (see Figure 5).
III. P RE - COMMITMENTS WITH ASYMMETRIC VALUATIONS
In this section, we consider pre-commitments in two-player General Lotto games where the
players’ valuations of the battlefields are asymmetric and relatively different. The main finding
in this section is that pre-committing can guarantee a payoff that outperforms the second-highest
equilibrium payoff that is available in nominal play. We begin with preliminaries on equilibrium
characterizations of our setup.
A. Equilibria of the nominal game GGL(XA , XB , α)
Recall the two-battlefield setup specified as GGL(XA , XB , α) (Figure 3a). Specifically, vA,1 =
α, vA,2 = 1 − α, vB,1 = 1 − α, and vB,2 = α for some α ∈ (0, 21 ]. To proceeed, we first establish
the following equilibrium characterizations.
Fact 3.1 (Using results from [17]). Each equilibrium of GGL(XA , XB , α) corresponds to a zero
of the function S(σ), given by
 h
i
(1−α)2
XA

α2
α
2

σ σ( α + 1−α ) − XB , σ ∈ (0, 1−α
)



XA
XA
α2
α
S(σ) :=
(σ 3 − X
) + ασ(1 − X
σ), σ ∈ [ 1−α
, 1−α
)
1−α
α
B
B




σ − XA ( α2 + (1−α)2 ),
σ ≥ 1−α
XB 1−α
α
α
For any zero σ ∗ , the expected equilibrium payoffs are given by


σ ∗ (1−α)2
α2
α

( α + 1−α
),
σ ∗ ∈ (0, 1−α
)

2


α
πA (σ ∗ ) = 1 − α − α∗ + α2 σ∗ ,
σ ∗ ∈ [ 1−α
, 1−α
)
2σ
2(1−α)
α




1 − 1 ,
σ ∗ ≥ 1−α
2σ ∗
α

∗

α

1 − σ2 ,
σ ∗ ∈ (0, 1−α
)



πB (σ ∗ ) = 1 − α − ασ∗ + ∗α2 , σ ∗ ∈ [ α , 1−α )
2
2σ (1−α)
1−α
α



2

 1 ( (1−α) + α2 ),
σ ∗ ≥ 1−α
2σ ∗
α
1−α
α
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XA (1−α)2
α2 −1
α
α
) < 1−α
is the unique root of S on the interval (0, 1−α
),
( α + 1−α
XB
2
2
(1−α)
XA
XA
α
which gives πA (σ ∗ ) = 2X
) ≥ 1−α
is the unique root of S
. Additionally, σ ∗ = X
( α + 1−α
α
B
B
XB
, ∞), which gives πB (σ ∗ ) = 2X
on the interval [ 1−α
.
α
A

Note that σ ∗ =

The function πA (σ ∗ ) is increasing in σ ∗ , while πB (σ ∗ ) is decreasing in σ ∗ . We will refer to
S as the solution function. It has been established that S(σ) is continuous and has at least one
zero [17]. In the result below, we show that S can either have a unique zero or have three zeros,
depending on the parameters. Such regions are depicted in Figure 6.
B
≤ 1 and S(σ− ) > 0, or
Lemma 3.1. The solution function S has "
three zeros if and only if# X
XA
r 
2
XB
XA
1−α XA
3α
. Otherwise, S has a unique
>
1
and
S(σ
)
<
0,
where
σ
:=
±
− 1−α
+
±
XA
3α
XB
XB

zero.
The proof is given in the Appendix. The equilibrium strategies are given as follows.
Fact 3.2 (Using results from [17]). Let σ ∗ be a zero of S, and let Ω(σ ∗ ) = {b ∈ {1, 2} :

vB,b
vA,b

≥

σ ∗ }. The corresponding unique equilibrium strategies are given as follows. For all b ∈ Ω(σ ∗ ),
vA,b ∗
λ∗
σ ) + B x,
vB,b
vB,b
∗
vA,j
λ
FB,b (x) = A x, x ∈ [0, ∗ ).
vA,b
λA
FA,b (x) = (1 −

x ∈ [0,

vA,j
)
λ∗A

(12)

For all b ∈
/ Ω(σ ∗ ),

Here, λ∗A :=

1
2XB

λ∗B
x,
vB,b

vB,j
)
λ∗B
vB,b
λ∗A
vB,j
)
+
FB,b (x) = (1 −
x, x ∈ [0, ∗ ).
∗
vA,b σ
vA,b
λB
P

2
P
vB,b
1
and λ∗B := σ ∗ λ∗A .
∗) v
b∈Ω(σ ∗ ) vA,b + (σ ∗ )2
b∈Ω(σ
/
A,b
FA,b (x) =

x ∈ [0,

(13)

The set Ω(σ ∗ ) can be interpreted as the set of battlefields that player B places priority on in the
equilibrium associated with σ ∗ , because it competes more aggressively on these battlefields than
player A does (12). Indeed, in a similar manner as the equilibrium strategies from GL games,
v

A,b ∗
α
player A “gives up” on each of these battlefields with a probability 1− vB,b
σ . If σ ∗ ∈ [ 1−α
, 1−α
),
α

for example, then B allocates more resources in expectation to its more valuable b = 2 than
player A does, and player A allocates more resources to battlefield 1 in expectation.
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In the forthcoming analysis on pre-commitments in the GGL game, we will not need to make
explicit use of the details of Fact 3.2 since we are concerned only with the associated payoffs.
Our results rely heavily on the characterization of the possibly non-unique equilibrium payoffs
in the GGL game (11).
B. Guaranteed payoffs through pre-commitments
Suppose player B has the option to pre-commit p ∈ [0, XB ] to one of the battlefields b ∈ {1, 2}.
If player A decides to match the pre-commitment p ≤ XA on b, its payoff is given by
uMA (p) = vA,b + (1 − vA,b ) · L(XA − p, XB − p).

(14)

That is, A secures b and both players use their remaining resources to compete on the other
battlefield. We note that a player’s equilibrium payoff is unique in a Generalized Lotto game that
has a single battlefield, and is given by the function L scaled by its valuation of that battlefield.
If player A decides to withdraw, its payoff is given by
uWA (p) = (1 − vA,b ) · L(XA , XB − p).

(15)

Player A will make the choice, match or withdraw, that optimizes its subsequent payoff:


max {uM (p), uW (p)} , if p ≤ XA
A
A
(16)
uA (p) =

uW (p),
if
p
>
X
A
A
Let Ab (p) ∈ {M, W} denote player A’s optimal response to the pre-commitment p on b. Player
B’s subsequent payoff is thus given by


(1 − vB,b )L(XB − p, XA − p),
if Ab (p) = M
uB (p) =

vB,b + (1 − vB,b )L(XB − p, XA ), if Ab (p) = W

(17)

The subsequent payoffs to both players are uniquely determined when player B elects to precommit ((16) and (17)). In scenarios where the nominal game GGL(XA , XB , α) admits multiple
payoff-distinct equilibria, one can thus view pre-committing as a way to guarantee a certain
level of payoff. We will show there are pre-commitments that ensure a payoff that exceed the
second-highest equilibrium payoff from the nominal, simultaneous move game GGL(XA , XB , α),
regardless of whether player B is the weaker or stronger player.
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Fig. 6: Parameters that admit three equilibria in GGL(XA , XB , α) is represented by the union of the blue and red
regions (Lemma 3.1). The blue region indicates where there exist pre-commitments (to the first battlefield, worth
1 − α) ensuring player B a payoff better than the second-highest equilibrium payoff (Theorem 3.1). In the red
region, multiple equilibria exist but pre-commitments cannot do better than the second-highest equilibrium payoff.

We can now compare the quality of the three equilibria in the nominal GGL game to the payoff
player B can ensure through a pre-commitment (17). In particular, we identify parameters for
which there are pre-commitments that ensure a better payoff than the second-highest equilibrium
payoff. Let us denote Z as the set of zeros of F , which by Lemma 3.1, is either a singleton
or contains three zeros. In cases where it has three zeros, let us denote σ1∗ , σ2∗ , and σ3∗ as the
zeros of F corresponding to the best, middle, and worst equilibrium payoff available to player
B, respectively. In particular, these satisfy σ1∗ < σ2∗ < σ3∗ and πB (σ1∗ ) > πB (σ2∗ ) > πB (σ3∗ ).
First, we establish that when player B is weaker, it never has an incentive to pre-commit to
the second (non-priority) battlefield, which has value vB,2 = α < 21 . The result below shows
that any pre-commitment to battlefield 2 yields a subsequent payoff worse than the worst-case
equilibrium payoff from the nominal GGL game.
Lemma 3.2. Suppose
value vB,2 = α <

1
2

XB
XA

≤ 1. If player B pre-commits p ∈ [0, XB ] to battlefield 2, which has

to player B, then uB (p) < minσ∗ ∈Z πB (σ ∗ ).

Proof. We show that player A matches any pre-commitment p ∈ [0, XB ]. The condition uMA (p) >
uWA (p) for all p ∈ [0, XB ] is equivalent to
α 2
XB
p − (1 − α(1 −
))p + α(XB − 2XA ) + XA > 0
2XA
2XA

(18)

for all p ∈ [0, XB ]. The condition holds by observing this function is strictly decreasing for
p ∈ [0, XB ], and its values at the endpoints are positive. Therefore, player B’s subsequent payoff

XB −p
is given by uB (p) = (1 − α) 2(X
. Note this is strictly decreasing in p, so maxp∈[0,XB ] uB (p) =
A −p)
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XB
uB (0) = (1 − α) 2X
.
A

When

XB
XA

≤ 1, player B’s worst-case payoff satisfies minσ∗ ∈Z πB (σ ∗ ) ≥

XB
2XA

> uB (0). Hence,

any pre-commitment leads to a payoff lower than the worst-case equilibrium of the nominal GGL
game.
■
Note that this result holds in all cases, i.e. whether there is a unique equilibrium (conditions of
Lemma 3.1 do not hold) or there are multiple equilibria. The following result demonstrates that
when there are multiple equilibria, and under mild conditions of the parameters, pre-commitments
can offer better a subsequent payoff than the second-highest equilibrium payoff available in
GGL(XA , XB , α).
Theorem 3.1. Suppose there are three equilibria in the nominal GGL game, i.e. conditions of
Lemma 3.1 are met. Then there are pre-commitments for player B that ensure its payoff (17)
q
2α
8α
B
B
− 1−α
≤X
≤ 1, or X
> 1.
exceeds the second-highest equilibrium payoff πB (σ2∗ ) (11) if 1−α
XA
XA
Proof. To prove the result, we first establish that πB (σ2∗ ) < 1 − α. Then, under the given
assumptions, we show there are pre-commitments to battlefield 1 that give a payoff uB (t) > 1−α
because they cause player A to withdraw.
α
In the nominal GGL game, the middle equilibrium payoff is πB (σ2∗ ) = 1−α+ α2 ( σ∗ (1−α)
−σ2∗ ) <
2
p α
1 − α. The inequality follows by establishing σ2∗ > 1−α
: since σ− < σ2∗ , it will suffice to show
q
α
p α
3(1+( 1−α
)2 )
XA
8α
√
that σ− > 1−α . This is equivalent to the condition XB < 2 α . We observe that ( 1−α
−
1−α
α
2
√
p α
3(1+(
) )
2α −1
α 2
for all α ∈ [0, 21 ], since this reduces to 1 < ( 2 + 1−α
) < 2√1−α
)(1 + ( 1−α
) ).
α
1−α
1−α

B
≤ 1 and player B pre-commits to battlefield 1 (Lemma 3.2). Player A is
Now, suppose X
XA
indifferent between M and W (eq. (16)) for the pre-commitment




 s
2
XA  XB
2α
XB
2α
8α 
p± =
+
±
+
−
.
2
XA
1−α
XA
1−α
1−α

Such values exist only if

XB
XA

≥

q

8α
1−α

(19)

2α
− 1−α
, where it follows that p± ∈ [0, XB ]. Here, A(p) = M

for p ∈ [0, p− ) ∪ [p+ , XB ], and A(p) = M for p ∈ [p− , p+ ). For the pre-commmitment p− , player

B −p−
B’s subsequent payoff is uB (p− ) = (1 − α) + α X2X
> 1 − α.
A

XB
XA

XB
XA

1+α
, player A is indiffer1−α
2α
B
ent between M and W for the pre-commitment p = 1+α
XB ≤ XB − XA . If X
< 1+α
, player A is
XA
1−α
q
h
XA
indifferent between M and W for the pre-commitment p = XB − 2(1−α)
(1 − 3α) + (1 − 3α)2 + 4(1

Suppose
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XB −XA . In either case, the pre-commitment p induces player A to withdraw, and the subsequent
B −p
payoff is uB (p) = 1 − α + α X2X
> 1 − α.
A

■

It is interesting that player B can have pre-commitments that ensure a payoff greater than
πB (σ2∗ ) whether it is the weaker or stronger player. Additionally, when player B is stronger, the
amount it needs to pre-commit to ensure a payoff greater than πB (σ2∗ ) is less than player A’s
budget XA . These aspects contrast with the result of Theorem 2.1: when player B is weaker in
the standard GL game, there are no pre-commitments that outperform the nominal equilibrium
payoff. When player B is stronger, a pre-commitment p > XA is required, i.e. to force player
A to withdraw.
When GGL(XA , XB , α) admits a unique equilibrium, we identify below a region where there
are beneficial pre-commitments, even when player B is the weaker player.
n q
o
q
XB
2α
8α
1−α
−
≤
<
min
1,
and there is a unique
Theorem 3.2. Suppose that
1−α
1−α
XA
3α
equilibrium of the nominal GGL game. Then there are precommitments for player B that ensures
its payoff exceeds the (unique) nominal equilibrium payoff.
n q
o
1−α
B
<
min
1,
Proof. The condition X
means both critical points σ± are in the second
XA
3α
α
interval [ 1−α
, 1−α
). The unique root σ ∗ of S also lies in the second interval, and satisfies σ− < σ ∗ .
α

Thus, πA (σ ∗ ) < 1 − α, by using the same reasoning in the proof of Theorem 3.1. The condition
q
XB
8α
2α
≥ 1−α
− 1−α
ensures there are pre-commitments that force player A to withdraw. Thus,
XA
player B can get at least a payoff of 1 − α through a pre-commitment.

■

IV. C ONCLUSION
This paper investigated competitive scenarios where publicly announcing strategic intentions
can have advantages. Conventional wisdom would suggest that this should not be the case, since
known strategies can be exploited by an opponent. We studied a formulation using General Lotto
games that allows one of the players to pre-commit resources before engaging in competition.
A main finding was that the weaker-resource player never has an incentive to do so, but a
stronger-resource player has incentives under certain conditions. We then studied a setting where
battlefields are not valued identically by the players. Without pre-commitments, this interaction
can yield multiple payoff-distinct equilibria. We found that a weaker-resource player does have
incentives to pre-commit resources. However, these incentives arise under a different context,
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where pre-committing can offer better performance than the second-highest equilibrium payoff
in the game without pre-commitments.
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A PPENDIX
Proof of Theorem 2.1. Suppose player B is weaker, i.e. XB < XA . Suppose player B precommits p ∈ [0, XB ] resources to battlefield b ∈ B that has any value vb ∈ [0, ϕ]. The claim is
that player B cannot attain a subsequent payoff uB (p) > πBnom from any pre-commitment. To
see this, consider the case that A matches the pre-commitment. Its payoff is
XB − p
)
2(XA − p)
XB − p
= ϕ − (ϕ − vb )
2(XA − p)

uA,{b} (p) = vb + (ϕ − vb )(1 −

(20)

This payoff always exceeds its nominal equilibrium payoff πAnom = ϕ(1 −
function

XB −p
XA −p

XB
),
2XA

since the

is decreasing on p ∈ [0, XA ). Note that uA (p) = πAnom if and only if (p, v) =

(0, 0), i.e. there is no pre-commitment. Player A’s subsequent payoff thus satisfies uA (p) =
max{uA,{b} (p), uA,∅ (p)} > πAnom . Therefore, uB (p) = ϕ − uA (p) ≤ πBnom , with equality if and
only if (p, v) = (0, 0).
Now, we illustrate the proof for XA < XB ≤ 2XA . Let us denote γ :=

XB
XA

as the budget

ratio, so that γ ∈ (1, 2]. Player A’s payoff from matching the pre-commitment is given by
uA,{b} (p) = vb + (ϕ − vb )

XA − p
2(XB − p)

(21)

Player A’s payoff from withdrawing against the pre-commitment is given by


(ϕ − vb ) XA ,
if p ≤ XB − XA
2(XB −p)
uA,∅ (p) =

(ϕ − vb )(1 − XB −p ), if p > XB − XA
2XA
If vb >

3−γ
ϕ,
5−γ

(22)

then Player B’s subsequent payoff is then given by


ϕ − uA,{b} (p),
if p ∈ [0, XA ]
uB (p) =

ϕ − (ϕ − vb )(1 − XB −p ), if p ∈ (XA , XB ]
2XA

(23)

The above expression is increasing on p ∈ [0, XA ) (A matches) and decreasing on p ∈ [XA , XB ]
(A withdraws). We observe that player B cannot exceed its nominal payoff for any pre-commitment
p ∈ [0, XA ). Indeed, the condition ϕ − uA,{b} (XA ) < πBnom is equivalent to vb >
show that

ϕ
2γ

<

3−γ
ϕ.
5−γ

This reduces to γ 2 − 27 γ +

5
2

ϕ
.
2γ

It suffices to

< 0, which is satisfied for all γ ∈ (1, 52 ).

The right-limit value limp↘XA uB (p) = ϕ − 12 (ϕ − vb )(3 − γ) exceeds the nominal equilibrium
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payoff if and only if vb > (1 −

1
)ϕ.
γ(3−γ)

Therefore, there exist beneficial pre-commitments

p > XA for player B if and only if the limit value satisfies v̄ > (1 −

1
)ϕ.
γ(3−γ)

For the remainder of the proof, we show there are no beneficial pre-commitments for all
ϕ, 3−γ
ϕ] (need γ < 2). Player A
other parameters. Let us consider the regime vb ∈ [ γ−1
γ+1
5−γ

becomes indifferent between matching and withdrawing under the pre-commitment p∗ = XB −
h
i
p
XA
2
2
(ϕ − 3vb ) + (ϕ − 3vb ) + 4(ϕ − vb ) (γ − 1) ≤ XA . Player B’s subsequent payoff is
2(ϕ−vb )
then given by
uB (p) =



ϕ − uA,{b} (p),

ϕ − (ϕ − vb )(1 −

if p ∈ [0, p∗ )
XB −p
),
2XA

(24)

∗

if p ∈ [p , XB ]

This is a continuous function in p, which is increasing on p ∈ [0, p∗ ) (A matches) and decreasing
on p ∈ [p∗ , XB ] (A withdraws). It takes its maximal value at p∗ . To prove uB (p∗ ) < πBnom , it

suffices to show that player B has an incentive to pre-commit only if player A matches a precommitment p > p∗, which is impossible due to (24). Indeed, ϕ − uMA (p) > πBnom reduces to
p>

1
)
2XB vb (1− 2γ

1
2ϕ(1− 2γ
)−(ϕ−vb )

. We will show the RHS is greater than t∗ . Such a condition is equivalent to
(γ + 1)vb2 − ϕ(2(γ − 1) + γ −1 )vb

(25)

+ ϕ2 (γ − 3 + 3γ −1 − γ −2 ) ≤ 0
Denote the above quadratic function as G(vb ). We claim the above inequality holds for all
3−γ
ϕ, 5−γ
ϕ]. Since G is convex, it suffices to show it is non-positive at the endpoints.
vb ∈ [ γ−1
γ+1

Indeed, one can show that G( γ−1
ϕ) < 0 and G( 3−γ
ϕ) < 0 for all γ ∈ (1, 2).
γ+1
5−γ
Now, consider the (remaining) regime vb <

γ−1
.
γ+1

The pre-commitment p∗ =

2vb
X
ϕ+vb B

≤

XB − XA renders player A to be indifferent between matching and withdrawing. Player B’s
subsequent payoff is given by



ϕ − uA,{b} (p),
if p ∈ [0, p∗ )



uB (p) = ϕ − (ϕ − vb ) XA ,
if p ∈ [p∗ , XB − XA )
2(XB −p)




ϕ − (ϕ − v )(1 − XB −p ), if p ∈ [X − X , X ]
b
B
A
B
2XA

(26)

This is increasing on p ∈ [0, p∗ ) (A matches) and decreasing on p ∈ [p∗ , XB ] (A withdraws).
Thus, uB (p) is maximized at p∗ , which yields
uB (p∗ ) = ϕ −
November 20, 2021
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ϕ
<ϕ−
= πBnom
2γ
2γ

(27)
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Hence, there is no incentive for player B to pre-commit any resources in this regime.
The case when γ ≥ 2 follows similar arguments. Here, there will only be two regimes:
vb ≤

ϕ
,
2γ−1

in which p∗ =

2vb
ϕ+vb

≤ XA is the pre-commitment that makes A indifferent between

matching and withdrawing, and vb >

ϕ
,
2γ−1

in which A matches any p ∈ [0, XA ] and withdraws

against any p ∈ (XA , XB ]. We omit technical details for brevity, as they follow similar approaches
to the regime γ ∈ (1, 2].

■

Proof of Lemma 3.1. We give the proof for

XB
XA

≤ 1, since the case

XB
XA

> 1 follows similar

arguments.
α
α
) since S(γ) < 0 for all γ ∈ (0, 1−α
).
There are no zeros of S in the first interval γ ∈ [0, 1−α

α
In the second interval σ ∈ [ 1−α
, 1−α
), the solution function is negative at the left endpoint:
α

α
) < 0 follows from
S( 1−α

XA
XB

≥ 1. The critical points are located at the two positive values

σ± . The first critical point, σ− , is a local maximum and the second critical point, σ+ , is a local
q
XA
3α
minimum. These points are defined as real numbers if and only if X
>
. Now, suppose
1−α
B
α
α
S(σ− ) > 0. We note that this assumption automatically implies that σ− ∈ ( 1−α
, 1−α
), i.e. it is in

α
since S(σ) < 0 on the first interval. We have σ− <
the second interval.
have σ− > 1−α
r We
2
 XA
XA
XA
XA
XA
3α
α
−
− 1−α
< 3 if X
< 3, and X
> 12 3 + 1−α
if XB > 3.
because X
XB
B
B
B

1−α
α

α
α
We know there is at least one zero in the interval [ 1−α
, 1−α
) because S( 1−α
) < 0. It will then
α

suffice to show that there is a point σ̂ ∈ (σ− , 1−α
] such that S(σ̂) < 0. This establishes there
α

α
are at least two roots in the interval [ 1−α
, 1−α
). A third root σ3∗ > σ+ is then guaranteed to exist
α

because S is strictly increasing (above a fixed rate) on (min{σ+ , 1−α
}, ∞).
α

) < 0. This holds if
Suppose the solution function is negative at the right endpoint, i.e. S( 1−α
α

and only if

XA
XB

>

(1−α)2
.
α3 +(1−α)3

In this regime, we can take σ̂ =

1−α
α

and we are done.

Now, suppose S( 1−α
) ≥ 0. Consider the point
α
σ̂ =
We have σ̂ <

1−α
α

if and only if

XA
XB

1 − α XA
> σ− .
3α XB

< 3, which is satisfied:

(28)
XA
XB

≤

(1−α)2
α3 +(1−α)3



2

< 3. At this point,

the solution function satisfies
1
3α
S(σ̂) ∝ +
3 1−α
This is negative whenever
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XA
XB

>

q

1
3

+


1−3
3α
(1
1−α

α
1−α

2 !
−

XA
XB

.

(29)

α 2
− 3( 1−α
) ). The expression inside the root takes
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its maximum value of 1 at α = 41 . Hence, under the assumption that

XA
XB

≥ 1, the above condition

is always met. Therefore, S(σ̂) < 0.
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